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CONSENT IN SPORTS & RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES: 
USING CONTRACT LAW TERMINOLOGY TO CLARIFY 
TORT PRINCIPLES 
Russ VerSteeg* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Today, the sports world is more aware of the importance of safety 
than ever before.  For millennia, humans have engaged in athletic 
and recreational activities that have involved serious physical risks.1 
The risks are not even confined to participant risk; officials, specta-
tors, and bystanders commonly suffer injuries as a result of athletics.2 
When injuries occur, there is a broad range of potential consequenc-
es.  Depending on the circumstances, an injured individual may re-
quire medical attention for both physical and mental rehabilitation.  
Families and friends of those injured may suffer emotional, financial, 
                                                 
* Professor, New England Law | Boston. I would like to thank Barry Stearns and Brian Flaherty, Re-
search Librarians at New England Law | Boston for their outstanding contributions. Thanks also to Lau-
ren M. Oliva for her excellent research assistance. 
1 See e.g., H.A. HARRIS, SPORT IN GREECE AND ROME 22–26 (1972) (describing, in particular, ancient 
Greek boxing and also an exceptionally brutal contest, the pankration, in which “[t]he only tactics 
which we know to have been banned were gouging – poking a thumb or finger into an opponent’s eye – 
and biting...”); id. at 151–243 (extensive discussions of Greek, Roman, and Byzantine chariot racing). 
See also NIGEL SPIVEY, THE ANCIENT OLYMPICS: A HISTORY 105–111 (2004) (describing the pankra-
tion and its brutality).   
2 See e.g., Allred v. Capital Area Soccer League, Inc., 669 S.E.2d 777 (N.C. App. 2008) (spectator who 
attended professional women's soccer match brought negligence action against soccer league and coun-
ty, injuries sustained when she was struck in the head by a soccer ball); Nemarnik v. Los Angeles Kings 
Hockey Club, L.P., 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 10 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 2002) (spectator at a Los Angeles Kings 
game was injured when a puck during pregame warm-ups left the playing area); Gallagher v. Cleveland 
Browns Football Co., 659 N.E.2d 1232 (Ohio 1996) (videographer sued the Cleveland Browns for neg-
ligence due to injuries received when two football players collided into him while he was taping a foot-
ball game); Friedman v. Houston Sports Ass'n, 731 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. App. 1987), writ refused NRE 
(Sept. 16, 1987) (eleven-year-old baseball spectator and her father brought action against owner of sta-
dium for injuries sustained when spectator was struck by foul ball); Thurston Metals & Supply Co., Inc. 
v. Taylor, 339 S.E.2d 538 (Va. 1986) (liability to one struck by golf club); Baker v. Mid Maine Med. 
Center, 499 A.2d 464 (Me. 1985) (liability to one struck by golf ball); Fish v. Los Angeles Dodgers 
Baseball Club, 128 Cal. Rptr. 807 (Cal. App. 1976) (liability to spectator hit by ball at baseball game); 
Pierce v. Murnick, 145 S.E.2d 11 (N.C. 1965) (action for personal injuries sustained by spectator when 
wrestler fell upon him from ring); Aaser v. City of Charlotte, 144 S.E.2d 610 (N.C. 1965) (spectator at 
hockey game was injured when struck in the ankle by a hockey puck being played with by a group of 
boys); Ulrich v. Minneapolis Boxing & Wrestling Club, Inc., 129 N.W.2d 288 (Minn. 1964) (spectator 
at wrestling match sustained injuries when he fell after being struck by referee); Toone v. Adams, 137 
S.E.2d 132 (N.C. 1964) (action by baseball umpire against baseball club, manager, and baseball fan for 
injuries sustained while umpire was proceeding); McFatridge v. Harlem Globe Trotters, 365 P.2d 918 
(N.M. 1961) (plaintiff struck by basketball thrown by player).  
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and other losses as well.  Yet, even in the face of such dangers, we 
persist in subjecting ourselves to such risks.  Presumably, whether 
we do so consciously or not, we all engage in a kind of risk-reward 
or cost-benefit analysis.  Those who participate in marathon running, 
skiing, snowboarding, surfing, horseback riding, football, hockey, 
soccer, lacrosse, baseball, basketball, climbing, white water rafting, 
golf, car racing, and hundreds of other sports and recreational activi-
ties are apparently willing to risk a great deal of negative conse-
quences in return for the prospect of positive consequences (e.g., the 
psychological thrill of participation and/or competition,3 satisfaction 
of accomplishment, improved physical and mental health, money – 
for some – and numerous other benefits that society recognizes as 
deriving from sports and recreational activities).4  
 The legal system has struggled with how to deal with such injuries.  
Today, the news and social media report scores of lawsuits brought 
by those who have been injured against other participants, coaches, 
officials, venue operators, and the institutions that organize and pro-
vide sports and/or recreational activities (e.g., NFL, NHL).5 Techni-
                                                 
3 See Angela Grippo and Brad Sagarin, The Biological Basis for the ‘Thrill of Victory,’ Psychology To-
day (Jan. 25, 2013),  https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/the-wide-wide-world-
psychology/201301/the-biological-basis-the-thrill-victory; Joachim Vogt Isaksen, The Psychology of 
Extreme Sports: Addicts, not Loonies, Popular Social Science (Nov. 5, 2012),  
http://www.popularsocialscience.com/2012/11/05/the-psychology-of-extreme-sports-addicts-not-
loonies/; Lindsey Konkel, Extreme Psychology; There may be more to high-risk sports than a “no fear” 
mantra, Science Line (July 13, 2009),  http://scienceline.org/2009/07/health-konkel-extreme-sports-
risk-psychology/.  
4 See e.g., Dryden, supra note 4, at 267 (“If someone asks us why we play, we’re not sure any longer. 
We might speak ritually of ‘loving the game’; then, embarrassed, skip on to winning, money, and the 
rest. And everyone understands.”). 
5 See Kenneth W. Simons, Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Pref-
erence, 67 B.U. L. REV. 213, 271–74 (1987) (discussing “Injuries in Sporting Events”). See e.g., Tom 
Worgo, The NHL Gets Nets but Can It Stop Lawsuits?, 31 HOCKEY DIGEST 12 (Nov. 2002) at 
http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/7444096/nhl-gets-nets-but-can-stop-lawsuits; Associated 
Press, Teenage Girl Dies After Getting Hit in the Head, ESPN (March 20, 2002), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=1354060; Ben Rohrbach, More bad news, Rams fans: 
Reggie Bush sues St. Louis over injury, Yahoo! Sports (Jan. 8, 2016), http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nfl-
shutdown-corner/more-bad-news--rams-fans--reggie-bush-sues-st--louis-over-injury-153559370.html 
(San Francisco 49ers running back Reggie Bush officially files a lawsuit against the St. Louis Conven-
tion and Visitors Commission after suffering a season-ending ACL injury after slipping on concrete 
surrounding the field at Edward Jones Stadium); Michael A. Orr, Eddie Johnson Files $9.9 Million 
Lawsuit Against Portland Timbers, Stumptown Footy (Feb. 6, 2014), 
http://www.stumptownfooty.com/portland-timbers/2014/2/6/5387998/eddie-johnson-files-9-9-million-
lawsuit-against-portland-timbers (Portland Timbers striker Eddie Johnson has filed suit against the 
club's parent company, Peregrine Sports, alleging the team and affiliated doctors and training staff al-
lowed him to practice while still suffering the effects of a concussion); Terry Frei, Trial for Todd Ber-
tuzzi attack on former Avalanche Steve Moore set for 2014, THE DENVER POST (Oct. 26, 2013), 
http://www.denverpost.com/avalanche/ci_24391981/justice-moore-ice  (Moore, then 25, suffered three 
fractured vertebrae, a concussion and brain damage. He hasn't played in the NHL since that night); Jar-
ed Clinton, Report: Denna Laing, family to sue NHL, women’s leagues after spinal cord injury, THE 
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cally speaking, the legal questions actually involve two very large 
fields of law: Tort and Contract.  To complicate matters further, there 
are several layers of analysis needed in order to resolve liability is-
sues related to injuries sustained as a result of sports and recreational 
activities.  
 This Article focuses primarily on how legal analysis should ad-
dress “consent” in the context of injuries sustained by those involved 
in sports and recreational activities.6 It is possible, and perhaps like-
ly, that this analysis is also applicable to the doctrine of “consent” in 
non-sports and recreational activities.  Part I of this Article explains 
the legal framework of the relationship between injuries and Tort 
law.  This Part examines, for example, basic principles of negligence, 
assault, and battery.  Part II discusses assumption of risk and consent, 
and explores their technical meanings.  This Part also considers the 
way that Contract law intersects with Tort in the form of “waivers of 
liability.”  Part III presents the central thesis of the Article. It ex-
plains how Contract Law principles provide an analysis superior to 
current Tort principles in evaluating “consent,” and recommends that 
Tort law abandon its unworkable, inferior terminology.  This Part al-
so briefly explores an exception to the law of consent, which helps to 
explain why the lawsuits brought by former NFL and NHL players 
have a great deal of merit.  The Conclusion briefly summarizes the 
concepts explained in the body of the Article. 
Basic Principles: Tort & Contract 
A. Overview 
Generally speaking, those injured as a result of sports and recrea-
tional activities – whether they are participants, officials, spectators, 
or bystanders – sustain their injuries as a result of: 1) negligence 
(e.g., a spectator mindlessly walking into the path of a runner during 
a road race); 2) dangers inherent in the activity itself  (e.g., the inci-
dental contact that occurs when two basketball or soccer players 
simultaneously attempt to gain possession of a loose ball); or, 3) in-
tentional actions (e.g., a hockey player deliberately checking another 
                                                                                                                
HOCKEY NEWS (Jan. 14, 2016), http://www.thehockeynews.com/blog/report-denna-laing-family-to-sue-
nhl-womens-leagues-after-spinal-cord-injury/ (Boston Pride forward Denna Laing is reportedly plan-
ning to sue the NHL after suffering a severe spinal cord injury during the Outdoor Women’s Classic on 
Dec. 31).  
6 Prosser says that consent is a topic that “is one of the most complex and difficult in the entire area of 
law.” W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 18 Consent, at 112 
(5th ed. 1984).  
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player or a football defender tackling a runner with the ball).7 The 
law of Torts has developed a specific vocabulary to refer to different 
kinds of conduct.  For purposes of analyzing sports and recreational 
activity injuries, when carelessness (i.e., a failure to act reasonably) 
causes injury, Tort law usually classifies that careless conduct as 
“negligence.”8 When an intentional act causes injury, Tort law typi-
cally refers to that intentional conduct either as “assault”9 or “bat-
tery.”10 Because those involved in sports and recreational activities 
willfully subject themselves to certain risks inherent in those sports 
and recreational activities, the legal system deals with their injuries 
differently than the ways that it deals with injuries sustained in eve-
ryday life (outside the scope of sports and recreational activities).11 
But before exploring the nuances of those differences, it is first use-
                                                 
7 See e.g., Dryden, supra note 4, at 160 (describing the numerous injuries that NHL players take for 
granted as being part of the game, including broken noses, a broken wrist, dislocated and separated 
shoulders, “an assortment of back sprains, knee sprains, hip pointers, groin pulls, cuts, bruised ribs and 
knees…. Then as things begin slowly to break down, it’s ice packs, heat packs, tape, pills, ointments, 
machines, the sports ethic, and us to keep us going.”). Of course, injuries might also result from a com-
bination of any or all of these. In addition, a discussion of injuries caused by defective products used in 
sports and recreational activities is beyond the scope of this Article. For an introduction to some of 
those issues, see Russ VerSteeg, Product Liability and Commercial Law Theories Relating to Concus-
sions, 10 J.  BUS. & TECH. L. 73 (2015). 
8 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 282 (1965) (“[N]egligence is conduct which falls below the 
standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm. It does not 
include conduct recklessly disregardful of an interest of others. Negligent conduct may consist either of 
an act, or an omission to act when there is a duty to do so.”); NEGLIGENCE, BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The failure to exercise the standard of care that a reasonably prudent 
person would have exercised in a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the legal standard es-
tablished to protect others against unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is intentionally, 
wantonly, or willfully disregardful of others' rights; the doing of what a reasonable and prudent person 
would not do under the particular circumstances, or the failure to do what such a person would do under 
the circumstances.”). 
9 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 21(1) (a)–(b) (1965) (“An actor is subject to liability to an-
other for assault if he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other 
or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and the other is thereby put in such 
imminent apprehension.”). 
10 See id. § 13(a)–(b) (“An actor is subject to liability to another for battery if he acts intending to cause 
a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehen-
sion of such a contact, and a harmful contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly re-
sults.”); see generally Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion and Con-
troversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV.  1585, 1606 (2012) (“The action in battery originated in the early common 
law writ of trespass, which included not only battery, but also assault, false imprisonment, trespass to 
land, and trespass to chattels.”) (footnote omitted);  Id. at 1607 (“Although conceived originally as cov-
ering force and violence, at some point early on it became clear that the writ of trespass covered many 
of what we would now view as offensive bodily contacts, such as ‘spitting upon a person; pushing an-
other against him; throwing a squib or any missile or water upon him.”) (footnotes omitted). 
11 See e.g., Murphy v. Steeplechase Amuse. Co., 166 N.E. 173 (N.Y. 1929) (“Volenti non fit injuria. 
One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far as they are obvious and 
necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his antagonist or a spectator at a ball game the 
chance of contact with the ball.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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ful to understand the basic doctrinal principles of negligence, assault, 
and battery that traditionally govern liability for injuries. 
B. Negligence12 
Hornbook law teaches that “negligence” occurs when one person 
owes a duty of reasonable care to another, he breaches that duty, and 
that breach proximately causes injury to the other.13 Whether one 
person owes another a duty of reasonable care is a question of law 
that a judge must decide.14 Typically, a duty arises because of some 
relationship between the parties.  The relationship can be very obvi-
ous, such as a teacher owing a duty of reasonable care to his stu-
dents.  It can also be more attenuated, such as a therapist owing a du-
ty of reasonable care to persons who may be endangered by his 
patient's conduct.15 A person breaches a duty of reasonable care 
when he fails to act as a reasonable person would have acted under 
similar circumstances.16 This is a question of fact, which, in a jury 
trial, is determined by the jury (i.e., as opposed to the question of 
                                                 
12 See Moore, supra note 10, at 1610 (“At some point courts began to distinguish between an action in 
negligence and an action in battery. Assault and battery came to be viewed as requiring something more 
than mere negligence on the part of the defendant, that is, a bad intent or willfulness. Even then, how-
ever, courts struggled to determine what a bad intent might be.”) (footnote omitted). 
13 See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., DOBBS’ LAW OF TORTS § 125 “The Elements: Meaning and Terminology” 
(2d ed. 2011) (“In the ordinary case, the defendant owes a duty of care. The only question about the 
duty in such cases is whether the care owed is some especially high kind of care or whether it is more 
modest. This phase of the duty issue is usually discussed in terms of the 'standard of care.' The duty or 
standard imposed in most cases is the duty of reasonable care under the circumstances, no more, no 
less.”). 
14 See id. § 251 (“No defendant is liable for negligence unless he is under a legal duty to use care. If the 
defendant is under no duty to use care, he is in effect exempted from the ordinary rules of negligence 
law and avoids all accountability and responsibility for harm inflicted. Whether the defendant owes a 
duty or not is determined by judges, not juries.”). 
15 See e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of U. of California, 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976) (“When a psycho-
therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should determine, that his patient 
presents a serious danger of violence to another he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect 
the intended victim against such danger.”). 
16 See Dan B. Dobbs et al., supra note 13, § 127 (“The duty owed by all people generally—the standard 
of care—is the duty to exercise the care that would be exercised by a reasonable and prudent person 
under the same or similar circumstances to avoid or minimize risks of harm to others… The reasonable 
and prudent person standard of care is often described as the standard of ordinary care, due care, or rea-
sonable care…the terms are interchangeable, and they all refer to external conduct that would be dictat-
ed by ‘care’ or ‘prudence.’”); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 283 cmt. c. (1965) (“In dealing with this 
problem the law has made use of the standard of a hypothetical 'reasonable man.' Sometimes this person 
is called a reasonable man of ordinary prudence, or an ordinarily prudent man, or a man of average pru-
dence, or a man of reasonable sense exercising ordinary care. It is evident that all such phrases are in-
tended to mean very much the same thing. The actor is required to do what this ideal individual would 
do in his place. The reasonable man is a fictitious person, who is never negligent, and whose conduct is 
always up to standard.”). 
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whether a duty exists, a question of law which the judge – not the ju-
ry – decides).17 In theory, in most instances, jurors are capable of 
evaluating whether someone has or has not acted in a manner appro-
priate for a reasonable person under the circumstances.  If a person 
has breached a duty of reasonable care, then a jury must also deter-
mine whether that breach proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury.18  
Like breach of duty, the question of “proximate cause” is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury.19 Proximate cause is complicated.  In order 
to analyze proximate cause, generally, a jury must answer two ques-
tions in the affirmative: 1) was the defendant’s conduct the actu-
al/but-for cause of the plaintiff’s injury; 2) was the general type of 
injury sustained, by the plaintiff, a foreseeable consequence of the 
defendant’s conduct.20 Typically, in order for a defendant’s conduct 
to constitute an actual/but-for cause of a plaintiff’s injury, we must 
find a cause-and-effect relationship between the two. Cause-and-
effect relationships tend to be grounded in three scientific disciplines 
(or combinations of them): 1) Physics (e.g., Newtonian Laws, such 
as “for every action there is an opposite and equal reaction,” or other 
physical laws relating to things such as matter, energy (including 
temperature), friction, and gravity); 2) Chemistry (e.g., when certain 
substances contact one another they produce heat or combustion); or 
3) Psychology (e.g., a great deal of human and other animal behavior 
is caused by the way brain functions cause us to react to external 
stimuli of various kinds).  But, in addition to determining whether 
there is an actual/but-for cause-and-effect relationship between a de-
fendant’s conduct and a plaintiff’s injury, “proximate cause” requires 
that a jury also determine that there is a close enough relationship be-
tween a defendant’s conduct and a plaintiff’s injury that it is fair, or 
                                                 
17 See Dan B. Dobbs et al., supra note 13, § 251 (“Whether the defendant owes a duty or not is deter-
mined by judges, not juries. Judges also determine the scope of the duty owed. On the other hand, juries 
determine all the other elements of the negligence case unless the answer is so clear that reasonable 
people cannot differ.”). 
18 See e.g., Wiegman v. Hitch-Inn Post of Libertyville, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 614, 620 (Ill. App. 1999) 
(“Proximate cause can be established only when there is a reasonable certainty that the defendant's act 
caused the injury, it cannot be predicated upon surmise or conjecture as to the cause of an injury.”). 
19 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 434 cmt. c. (1965) (“The question of what actually occurred in 
any particular case is for the jury, unless this is agreed upon, admitted by the pleadings, or found by 
special verdict, or unless the testimony is so undisputed and uncontradictory that there is only one infer-
ence which reasonable men could draw from it. If this is the case, the court must determine whether the 
actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the plaintiff's harm, unless this question is itself 
open to reasonable difference of opinion, in which case it is for the jury.”). 
20 See Dan B. Dobbs et al., supra note 13, § 125 (“In addition to proving causation in fact, the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant's conduct was a 'proximate cause' of the plaintiff's harm, meaning that the 
harm was the general kind that was unreasonably risked by the defendant, the kind of harm the defend-
ant should have been more careful to avoid.”). 
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just, to hold the defendant responsible.  
Although many judges and courts have formulated a number of 
analytical methods for assessing this issue, most use “foreseeability” 
as the determining factor.21 As a general rule, if a reasonable person 
should have anticipated a result, Tort law considers the result “fore-
seeable.”22 In simple terms, then, if a reasonable person, prior to 
and/or in the midst of performing some action should anticipate that 
his conduct will result in injury to another, Tort law treats that per-
son’s conduct as a “proximate cause” of the injury if, in fact, injury 
does occur.23  
C. Assault 
In Tort law, the word “assault” has a meaning that is quite differ-
ent from what most laypersons typically assume. Laypersons, unfa-
miliar with Torts, usually think of harmful or offensive physical con-
tact when they hear the term “assault.”  This misconception is mostly 
due to its meaning in Criminal law.  Laypersons ordinarily are famil-
iar with the Criminal law definition of “assault” as a result of reading 
it or hearing it in the media, which frequently reports such instances.  
However, as any first year law student knows, in the law of Torts, 
“assault” has its own technical meaning.  In Tort law, “assault” oc-
curs when a person intentionally causes another to apprehend (i.e., 
perceive) imminent harmful or offensive contact.24 For example, 
when A sees B load a gun with live ammunition and watches B point 
it at him and fire it at close range, A apprehends/perceives imminent 
harmful contact. Assuming for the sake of argument that B’s conduct 
satisfies the definition of “intentional,”25 B has probably committed 
the tort of “assault,” even if A suffers no physical contact (e.g., if the 
                                                 
21 See id. § 205 (“[C]ourts usually reduce the tests of scope of liability or proximate cause, both in direct 
and in intervening cause cases, to a question of foreseeability… To some extent, the language of fore-
seeability is simply a shorthand expression intended to say that the scope of the defendant's liability is 
determined by the scope of the risk he negligently created.”). 
22 See id. § 206 (“The foreseeability or risk rule holds the defendant subject to liability if he could rea-
sonably foresee the nature of the harm done, even if the total amount of harm turned out to be quite un-
foreseeably large.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 cmt. a “Foreseeability of Harm or Man-
ner of Its Occurrence”(1965) (“However, the manner in which the harm occurs may involve the 
cooperation of other assisting factors so numerous and so important that the actor's negligence cannot 
be regarded as a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.”). 
23 See Dan B. Dobbs et. al., supra note 13, § 125 (“A plaintiff cannot recover without showing actual 
harm resulting from the defendant's conduct.”). 
24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 22 cmt. a “Attempt Unknown to Other” (1965) (“It is, there-
fore, necessary not only that the act should be done with intention but that it should actually have put 
the plaintiff in apprehension of an immediate contact.”). 
25 For more on the meaning of “intent,” see infra Part III. 
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bullet misses him).  The Tort of “assault” protects a person’s interest 
in mental tranquility.26  
Consider this rule as it might apply in baseball: If a pitcher inten-
tionally throws a “brush-back” pitch, attempting only to pitch the 
ball close to a batter (even without actually trying to hit him), and the 
batter perceives imminent harmful or offensive contact, then the 
pitcher would be subject to liability for “assault.”  But, because of 
several other rules, discussed below, pitchers are not liable for as-
sault in such circumstances.27 However, if a person were to throw a 
ball, in this manner, at a stranger in a non-baseball/non-sports set-
ting, such conduct would ordinarily constitute assault. 
D. Battery 
For purposes of this Article, “battery” is probably the most im-
portant tort. “Battery” occurs when a person intentionally causes 
harmful or offensive contact with another.28 Although there are nu-
ances in the rule, the basic concept is simple enough:29 When A in-
tentionally strikes B with his fist, that conduct ordinarily constitutes 
the tort of “battery.” In an ordinary American football game, for ex-
ample, in the absence of special rules applicable to the sport, there 
                                                 
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 24 cmt. b. “What Constitutes Apprehension” (1965) (“It is not 
necessary that the other believe that the act done by the actor will be effective in inflicting the intended 
contact upon him. It is enough that he believes that the act is capable of immediately inflicting the con-
tact upon him unless something further occurs.”). 
27 See infra Part II. 
28 See Moore, supra note 10, at 1588 (“[S]ome have argued that the essence of battery is not the intent 
to cause a harmful or offensive contact, but rather the intent to cause an unpermitted contact, thereby 
raising questions concerning the precise nature of the relationship between the defendant's intent and 
the plaintiffs lack of consent.”) (footnotes omitted, italics original); id. at 1597 (“[B]attery requires that 
the defendant perform: (1) an act, (2) with the intent ‘to cause a harmful or offensive [bodily] contact’ 
(or the imminent apprehension of such a contact), (3) that directly or indirectly causes, (4) a harmful or 
offensive bodily contact.”) (footnotes omitted); Danuta Mendelson, Historical Evolution and Modern 
Implications of Concepts of Consent to, and Refusal of, Medical Treatment in the Law of Trespass, 17 J. 
LEGAL MED. 1, 4-5 (1996). “ The modern tort of battery has been defined as an intentional wrong 'which 
is committed by intentionally bringing about a harmful or offensive contact with the person of another.;  
This will happen when the direct offensive contact with the body of another had been desired (purpos-
ive) or known to be substantially certain to result.  The tort is based on the principle that other persons 
do not have the right to interfere with the person of another unless he or she validly consents to such an 
interference. The law considers the tort of trespass to person as safeguarding not only the personal in-
terest in one's physical integrity, but also as protecting the individual against any interference that is 
offensive to a reasonable sense of dignity and personal autonomy.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
29 Although the basic principle is relatively simple, Professor Moore cautions that the doctrine, as a 
whole, is not. See Moore, supra note 10, at 1595 (“[N]either beginning law students nor experienced 
lawyers should be misled into thinking that modem intentional torts such as battery are relatively simple 
and straightforward or that the Second Restatement clearly articulates the doctrine as it has been applied 
by a majority of courts.”). 
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would be battery on nearly every play where one player intentionally 
blocks or tackles another, since these actions are typically intentional 
harmful contact that causes some degree of injury (even if the injury 
is a de minimis soft tissue inflammation).  Indeed, most “contact 
sports” involve participant conduct that would be considered “bat-
tery” if that conduct were to occur in a non-sports context or setting. 
Intentional fouls in basketball, checking in ice hockey, and baseball 
players sliding into second base and making contact with the defend-
er in an attempt to break up a double play, would all be considered 
“battery” in the absence of special rules governing the games.30 Pre-
sumably many, but certainly not all, athletes who have suffered con-
cussions while playing contact sports have suffered them as a result 
of conduct that would be considered “battery” in non-sports settings.  
Assumption of Risk & Consent 
A. Overview 
“Assumption of risk” and “consent” are technical terms; they are 
words that have special meanings in the vocabulary of Tort law.  As 
such, it is important to define these terms carefully and to use them 
correctly in order to be precise and clear when using them as “terms 
of art.”  Assumption of risk is a term used to describe an affirmative 
defense to negligence.31 Consent is a term that relates to intentional 
torts, not negligence. Many have used the old Latin phrase, volenti 
non fit injuria (“no wrong accrues for one who is willing”) as a 
shorthand for both of these concepts.32  
                                                 
30 See e.g., Dryden, supra note 4, at 190 (explaining that his Montreal, Canadian coach, Scotty Bowman, 
exhorted his players to intentionally try to hit, and, presumably, hurt an opposing player: “Then more 
slowly again, his voice an angry baritone, ‘Put that guy down.’”) (italics in original); id. at 220 (“Deliv-
ered mid-ice with shoulder or hip, a body-check is the universal symbol of Canadian hockey. Hard, 
clean, elemental, a punishing man-to-man contest…”); id. at 243 (hypothesizing about the origins of 
body checking in the game of ice hockey, Dryden remarks, “But inadvertent or not, early players soon 
discovered that in a puck carrier’s game, collisions were effective deterrents.”); id. at 250 (“Hockey was 
a rough game, and had been very nearly from its start. Its speed, its confined, congested playing area, 
had almost guaranteed it, and made body-checking accepted defense strategy.”). 
31 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A “Assumption of Risk: General Principal” (1965) (“A 
plaintiff who voluntarily assumes a risk of harm arising from the negligent or reckless conduct of the 
defendant cannot recover for such harm.”). 
32 See e.g., Fitzgerald v. Conn. River Paper Co., 29 N.E. 464, 465 (Mass. 1891) (“The rule of law, brief-
ly stated, is this: One who knows of a danger from the negligence of another, and understands and ap-
preciates the risk therefrom, and voluntarily exposes himself to it, is precluded from recovering for an 
injury which results from the exposure.”); Murphy v. Steeplechase Amuse. Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 
(N.Y. 1929). “Volenti non fit injuria. One who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere 
in it so far as they are obvious and necessary, just as a fencer accepts the risk of a thrust by his antago-
nist or a spectator at a ball game the chance of contact with the ball.” Id. (footnotes omitted). See also 
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B. Assumption of Risk: Express & Implied 
1. Express 
Technically, there are several kinds of assumption of risk.  First, a 
person might expressly assume a risk of injury by agreeing, either in 
writing or orally, to undertake an activity.  When a person expressly 
acknowledges that he or she is willing to assume risks, we refer to 
that as “express assumption of risk.”33 Today, many people expressly 
assume risks of injury by means of contracts.  Those who provide 
horseback riding lessons, ski instruction, gymnastics instruction, 
skydiving opportunities, and the like, typically require participants to 
sign so-called waivers of liability.34 Such waivers usually include 
language that states that the participant is aware of the many dangers 
presented by the activity in question and that, as partial consideration 
for the service provider’s willingness to provide facilities – and 
sometimes instruction – for that activity, the participant expressly as-
sumes those risks, waives his/her right to sue the service provider, 
and agrees to hold the service provider harmless for any injuries.35 
Thus, in many instances, participants expressly assume risks.  
2. Implied: Primary & Secondary 
In addition to express assumption of risk, there are also circum-
stances in which Tort law deems persons to have assumed risks im-
pliedly.  This is implied assumption of risk. To complicate matters 
further, Tort law has developed two separate kinds of implied as-
sumption of risk: primary and secondary.36 “Primary assumption of 
                                                                                                                
Simons, supra note 5, at 248–58 (discussing doctrinal similarities between assumption of risk and con-
sent). 
33 See e.g., Coleman v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 933 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1991) (“Express assump-
tion of risk demands an explicit agreement…”). 
34 See Simons, supra note 5, at 234 (“Would the reasonably prudent person ever try the experimental 
sport of hang gliding?”). 
35 See e.g., Chauvlier v. Booth Creek Ski Holdings, Inc., 35 P.3d. 383 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). See also 
Simons, supra note 5, at 224 (“Sometimes a plaintiff specifically agrees not to hold defendant liable for 
conduct that would otherwise be tortious. Such waivers will often be enforced, especially when they are 
in contractual form.”). 
36 See Dan B. Dobbs et al., supra note 13, § 238 (“'[P]rimary assumption of risk' is used to indicate the 
no-duty or no-breach conception and its attendant complete-bar effect; and the term 'secondary assump-
tion of risk' is used to indicate the contributory negligence conception.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 496A cmt. c. “Assumption of Risk: General Principal” (1965). “Primary implied assumption 
of risk may be illustrated by the case in which a plaintiff has been injured as a natural incident of engag-
ing in a contact sport. It may also be seen in the act of a spectator entering a baseball park, thereby con-
senting that the players proceed without taking precautions to protect her from being hit by the ball.” Id. 
See e.g., Foronda ex rel. Est. of Foronda v. Haw. Intern. Boxing Club, 25 P.3d 826, 835–36 (Haw. App. 
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the risk is the judicially created affirmative defense whereby a de-
fendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff against certain risks that 
are so inherent in an activity that they cannot be eliminated.”37  As 
Catherine Hansen-Stamp has explained:  
 
the application of the…[doctrine] requires a duty analy-
sis: if the injury results from an inherent risk, the pro-
vider owes no legal duty, plaintiff's cause of action must 
fail….  If the injury does not result from an inherent 
risk, plaintiff may go on to prove that the provider's neg-
ligence caused his injuries.38 
 
The principal reason why primary implied assumption operates to 
negate liability is best explained as a matter of policy:  The nature of 
the activity is what dictates whether the rule applies. Most activities 
– especially sports and recreational activities – present risks that, be-
cause of the very nature of the activity, cannot be eliminated.39 For 
example, in his book, The Game, the former Montreal Canadiens 
goalie, Ken Dryden, described the knee ligament and shoulder inju-
ries of a teammate, remarking, “For though only in his mid-twenties, 
he can see a clear, disquieting pattern emerging to his career, and 
he’s just beginning to know that from now until he retires, it won’t 
                                                                                                                
2001). “Primary implied assumption of risk contemplates a plaintiff who reasonably chooses to bear a 
particular risk of harm. Conversely, the defendant owes no legal duty to protect the plaintiff from any 
harm that risk may entail… Secondary implied assumption of risk refers to a plaintiff's unreasonable 
decision to confront a risk of harm created by the defendant's negligence.” 
Id. (quoting Tancredi v. Dive Makai Charters, 823 F. Supp. 778 (D. Haw. 1993)). Foronda, 25 P.3d 
826, 834 (Haw. App. 2001). “In its 'secondary' sense, implied assumption of risk focuses on a plaintiff's 
conduct, and describes a situation where plaintiff knows of the danger presented by a defendant's negli-
gence and proceeds voluntarily and unreasonably to encounter it. A plaintiff's assumption of risk is un-
reasonable, and a form of contributory negligence, where the known risk of harm is great relative to the 
utility of plaintiff's conduct.” Id. (quoting Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 
(N.J. 1959)).  Meistrich v. Casino Arena Attractions, Inc., 155 A.2d 90, 93 (N.J. 1959). “[I]n area in 
which injury or damage was neither intended nor expressly contracted to be nonactionable, assumption 
of the risk has two distinct meanings, in one sense being an alternate expression for proposition that 
defendant was not negligent in that he either owed no duty or breached no duty owed and in a second-
ary sense as an affirmative defense to an established breach of duty and in which sense it is indistin-
guishable in its nature from contributory negligence.” Id. 
37 Bundschu v. Naffah, 768 N.E.2d 1215, 1221 (Ohio App. 2002). See also Coleman v. Ramada Hotel 
Operating Co., 933 F.2d 470, 477 (7th Cir. 1991) (“In primary implied assumption of risk, the plaintiff 
assumes risks inherent in the nature of the activity…”). 
38 Catherine Hansen-Stamp, Recreational Injuries and Inherent Risks: Wyoming’s Recreational Safety 
Act – An Update, 33 LAND & WATER L. REV. 249, 260 (1998) (footnotes omitted). 
39 See e.g., Dryden, supra note 4, at 133 (discussing the fear of being hit and hurt as simply being ex-
pected while playing goalie in the NHL); id. at 138 (“I should catch more, but years of concussion have 
left the bones in my hand and wrist often tender and sore, and learning to substitute a leg or a stick to 
save my hand, my catching glove reprogrammed and out of practice, often remains at my side.”). 
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change much.”40 We might say that such risks are intrinsic or inher-
ent, or that such risks exist due to the necessity of the structure of the 
activity itself. And given the intrinsic, inherent, or necessary nature 
of such risks, it would be unfair or unjust to hold persons liable when 
those risks produce injury.41 The rule of primary assumption of risk 
functions to hold those who participate in or provide activities liable 
for injury to others participating, if and only if, the injury is caused 
by reckless or intentional conduct, but not for mere negligence or 
even for what some describe as gross negligence.42  
The California Supreme Court’s explanation of the difference be-
tween primary and secondary assumption of risk in Knight v. 
Jewett43 is helpful. In Knight, the plaintiff and defendant were on op-
posite sides in an informal game of touch football using a peewee 
football, and the plaintiff suffered a serious hand injury during the 
game, which resulted in three surgeries and, ultimately, amputation 
of a finger.44 The court analyzed the assumption of risk and, in an ex-
tensive discussion, differentiated between primary assumption of risk 
and secondary assumption of risk within the context of comparative 
fault:45  
Primary assumption of risk is defined as a legal conclu-
sion that there is no duty for the defendant to protect the 
plaintiff from a risk.  Secondary assumption of risk, on 
the other hand, is defined as the defendant having a duty 
of care to the plaintiff, but the plaintiff knowingly en-
counters the risk caused by the breach of duty.46  
                                                 
40 Id. at 162. 
41 See e.g., Simons, supra note 5, at 240. “[S]ometimes an activity is unavoidably dangerous: it cannot 
be made safer. In that event, the defendant cannot offer choice (3), i.e., she cannot offer the activity's 
benefit without its costs. If the plaintiff has chosen to engage in such an activity, with knowledge of the 
risks, then he has consented or assumed the risk, in the full and not the limited sense. Perhaps he wishes 
that there were a safer way to engage in the activity, but there is not. His consent, therefore, should or-
dinarily be effective.” Id.; id. at 271–72. “The plaintiff is unlikely to recover for risks that ‘are almost 
inevitable from the conduct on the part of the other contestants to which he... gives his assent.’ Even 
violation of the rules of the sport might not lead to recovery.  However, a plaintiff may recover for inju-
ries suffered from certain acts, including but not limited to flagrant violations of the rules.” Id. (foot-
notes omitted). 
42 See infra Parts II and III for more discussion about primary assumption of risk. 
43 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992). 
44 Id. at 696. 
45 Id. at 704–11. 
46 Id. at 704–05. See also Coleman v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 933 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1991) (“[I]n 
secondary implied assumption of risk, the plaintiff assumes risks that are created by the defendant’s 
negligence.”); TERENCE J. CENTNER, AMERICA’S BLAME CULTURE: POINTING FINGERS AND SHUNNING 
RESTITUTION 81 (2008). “Secondary assumption of risk generally involves a breach of a duty not to 
increase the risks encountered by plaintiffs beyond the level inherent in the sport. Secondary assump-
tion of risk also involves a breach of a duty of care by a defendant and additional facts suggesting that 
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The Knight court explained the distinction between primary and 
secondary assumption of risk as follows: the question whether the 
defendant owed a legal duty to protect the plaintiff from a particular 
risk of harm does not turn on the reasonableness or unreasonableness 
of the plaintiff's conduct, but rather on the nature of the activity or 
sport in which the defendant is engaged and the relationship of the 
defendant and the plaintiff to that activity or sport.47  
The Court further defined primary implied assumption of risk 
more clearly:  In cases involving “primary assumption of risk”—
where, by virtue of the nature of the activity and the parties' relation-
ship to the activity, the defendant owes no legal duty to protect the 
plaintiff from the particular risk of harm that caused the injury—the 
doctrine continues to operate as a complete bar to the plaintiff's re-
covery.48 
C. Consent 
Few ideas are more central to law than that of consent. 
The presence or absence of valid consent commonly 
helps determine the distribution of legal rights. We can 
hardly imagine the law of contracts, of property, or of 
crimes and torts – including battery, trespass, assump-
tion of the risk, and informed medical consent – apart 
from the idea of consent.49 
 
According to Dobbs, “One who consents or apparently consents to 
acts that would otherwise count as an intentional tort cannot recover 
damages for those acts.”50  
 
Consent as a legal concept developed originally within 
the context of the law of trespass. Trespass is a generic 
                                                                                                                
the plaintiff knew of the danger and decided to encounter the risk.” Id. (footnotes omitted). See also 
Simons, supra note 5, at 215. (“In cases of ‘primary’ assumption of risk, defendant is not negligent – 
either he owed no duty or he did not breach the duty owed. ‘Secondary’ assumption of risk is an affirm-
ative defense to an established breach of duty, and exists only if plaintiff was contributorily negligent.”) 
(footnote omitted). 
47 Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 704 (Cal. 1992). 
48 Id. at 708. 
49 R. George Wright, Consenting Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 
75 B.U. L. REV.1397 (1995) (footnote omitted). 
50 Dan B. Dobbs, et. al., supra note 13, § 95, 216 “Consent as a Bar.” Id. at 218 § 96 (“Either actual or 
apparent consent is effective to relieve the actor of responsibility for the acts addressed.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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term that encompasses all kinds of wrongful direct and 
intentional interferences with persons, land, and chattels 
(goods). Trespass to person comprises three separate 
torts – battery, assault, and the tort of false (wrongful) 
imprisonment.51  
 
As was mentioned, “consent” is a term used in the context of inten-
tional torts, such as assault and battery, whereas “assumption of risk” 
is a term used in connection with negligence.52 It is best not to con-
fuse or conflate the two terms.53 To further complicate matters, un-
like assumption of risk, which is an affirmative defense to negli-
gence, lack of “consent,” technically, is a required element of a 
plaintiff’s prima facie case.54 According to Prosser, “Consent ordi-
                                                 
51 Mendelson, supra note 28, at 4 (footnote omitted). 
52 See Dan B. Dobbs, et. al., supra note 13, § 95, 217 “Consent as a Bar” (“An analogous rule applies in 
some but not all negligence cases under the name of assumed risk.”); W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 
6, § 18, 112 (“A similar but different question relates to the questionable defense of voluntary assump-
tion of the risk to otherwise actionable, accidental invasions giving rise to negligence, or even some 
kind of strict liability.”) (footnote omitted). One might wonder, if “assumption of risk” and “consent” 
are really analogous, why the legal community does not use the same terminology to refer to the same 
concepts.  In order to avoid confusion and increase the likelihood of consistency, perhaps we should use 
the same terminology; perhaps we should not use different terminology for “consent” and “assumption 
of risk.” 
53 See Simons, supra note 5, at 214–15 (“Consent is an accepted defense to an intentional tort; why then 
are we uncertain about the status of assumption of risk, which is often equated with consent?”). Curi-
ously, however, Professor Simons, himself, on occasion, conflates the two terms. See e.g., id. at 249 
(“[I]f an athlete is deemed to assume the risk of some intentional contacts during a sporting event, he 
has agreed to an uncertain risk of an intentional tort.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 251(“Consent and as-
sumption of risk doctrine are directly analogous in significant ways. Both traditionally operate as com-
plete defenses. Both essentially rely on the plaintiff's subjective preferences or desires. But there are 
some subtle contrasts, as well.”) (footnote omitted). 
54 See e.g., Moore, supra note 10, at 1591–92. (“The casebooks diverge, however, on whether a plain-
tiff’s actual or apparent consent is an affirmative defense or whether lack of consent is a part of the 
plaintiff’s prima facie case. Many of the casebooks present consent as an affirmative defense that must 
be pleaded and proved by the defendant. Other casebooks observe that some courts treat consent as an 
affirmative defense, while others treat the absence of consent as an element of the plaintiff's prima facie 
case.”) (footnotes omitted). Id. at 1603 (“In some cases, courts have brought into the definition of a bat-
tery the requirement that the plaintiff prove the absence of consent, sometimes substituting lack of con-
sent for the intent to commit a harmful or offensive contact.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 1612. (“[W]ith 
respect to the required intent, apparently originated the phrase ‘intention of bringing about a harmful or 
offensive contact’ as a substitute for the prior emphasis by courts and commentators on ‘unlawful,’ 
‘wrongful,’ or ‘constructive’ intent. The First Restatement recognized that absence of consent was an 
essential aspect of battery…” (footnotes omitted).  
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 cmt. d. (1965) (“[T]he absence of consent is a matter 
essential to the cause of action, and it is uniformly held that it must be proved by the plaintiff as a nec-
essary part of his case”). See also, Ford v. Ford, 10 N.E. 474, 475 (Mass. 1887) (“The absence of lawful 
consent is part of the definition of an assault…”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 10 cmt. c. 
“Privilege” (1965). (“There is an important difference between those privileges which are based on the 
consent of the person affected by the actor's conduct and those which are created by law irrespective of 
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narily bars recovery for intentional interferences with person or 
property. It is not, strictly speaking, a privilege, or even a defense, 
but goes to negative the existence of any tort in the first instance.”55 
He explains further that “[c]onsent avoids recovery simply because it 
destroys the wrongfulness of the conduct as between consenting par-
ties….”56 Professor Dobbs’s treatise expresses the same principle:  
 
In many cases, consent is not a true defense but instead 
marks a deficiency in the plaintiff’s prima facie case.  
For example, the defendant does not intend an offensive 
battery when he touches the plaintiff in a consented-to 
way. The plaintiff’s consent in such case negates any 
tortuous intent, so the plaintiff fails in one element of 
her proof.57  
“Under the Second Restatement, as well as in the vast majority of 
jurisdictions, the absence of consent is part of the plaintiff’s prima 
facie case….”58 In the specialized field of medical treatment, the Tort 
doctrine has imposed an additional requirement that consent be “in-
formed.”59 
                                                                                                                
the other's consent. The latter type of privilege must always be pleaded and proved by one who seeks 
thereby to destroy the seemingly tortious character of his conduct, and so protect himself from being 
subject to liability. On the other hand, where the privilege is based upon the consent of the other affect-
ed by the actor's conduct, there is a distinction between consent to invasions of the interests of personal-
ity, in which the burden is upon the plaintiff to prove absence of consent, and consent to all other legal-
ly protected interests, including the possessory and proprietary interest in land and chattels, in which the 
burden of proving the consent is upon the defendant.”)  
55 W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 6, § 18, 112. See also Mendelson, supra note 28, at 5–6. (“The 
courts regard the role of consent in trespass as generally having the effect of transforming what would 
otherwise be unlawful contact into accepted, and acceptable, conduct. Therefore, consensual contact 
does not, ordinarily, amount to battery.”) (footnote omitted). 
56 W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 6 § 18, 113. 
57 Dan B. Dobbs, et. al., supra note 13, at 218. See also W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 6, at 113 
(“Consent avoids recovery simply because it destroys the wrongfulness of the conduct as between the 
consenting parties, however harmful it may be to the interest of others, and even though it is perhaps 
both immoral and criminal.”). See also Mendelson, supra note 28, at 3.(“The law of trespass to per-
son…focuses on the patient's right to be free of any unwanted bodily contacts and the right to decide 
whether or not such contacts should occur. Therefore, the ultimate issue of the physician's liability in 
trespass to person has to be determined by reference to the presence or absence of valid consent.”) 
58 Moore, supra note 10, at 1635 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 1654–55 (“[T]he ALI should decide 
whether to include absence of consent as an element of the plaintiff's prima facie case, or alternatively, 
to specify that consent (either actual or apparent) is an affirmative privilege or defense.”) (“I believe the 
better position is to make consent an affirmative defense, just like self-defense, defense of others, and 
defense of property. It is unclear to me why consent functions differently, given that it is not limited to 
actual consent but includes apparent consent, which is very much like the reasonableness tests of other, 
clearly affirmative defenses.”) Id. at n. 391. 
59 Mendelson, supra note 28, at 24. (“In the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, the law considers 
consent to medical treatment as ‘real’ or ‘valid’ for the purposes of battery if it is given by a competent 
person who has made the decision voluntarily upon being informed in broad terms of the nature of the 
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Categories/Labels & Analysis of Assumption of Risk, Consent, and 
Contracts: Changes Suggested 
A. Overview 
One of the most important things that legal analysis requires is 
clarity of definitions.  In order to resolve any legal dispute, we must 
ascertain, as best as we can, what the facts are and be clear about 
what legal labels, or terms, we use to characterize those facts.  If we 
fail either to ascertain true facts or to characterize those facts appro-
priately, using accurate terms and definitions of those terms, we run 
the risk of making mistakes in decision-making.  We have noted that 
there are three sub-categories of “assumption of risk”: 1) “Express 
Assumption of Risk,” which occurs when a person overtly communi-
cates a willingness to subject herself to the risk of negligence (e.g., a 
written waiver of liability); 2) “Secondary Implied Assumption of 
Risk,” which occurs when a person subjectively understands the na-
ture and scope of risks involved in any given activity, but, neverthe-
less, participates in that activity and is cognizant of those risks;60 and 
3) “Primary Implied Assumption of Risk,” which occurs when a per-
son participates in an activity, which has certain risks that are intrin-
sic, inherent, or necessary (perhaps some might even say that such 
risks are “open” or “obvious”) as part of the nature of the activity 
(e.g., when on a golf course one ordinarily assumes the risk of being 
hit by an errant shot struck by another golfer).  
The American legal system also recognizes three sub-categories 
for “consent”: 1) “Actual Consent” (or “Consent in Fact”), which oc-
curs when a person truly, subjectively agrees to conduct by another 
which, absent consent, would be an intentional Tort (e.g., such as as-
sault or battery);61 2) “Apparent Consent,” which occurs when a per-
                                                                                                                
procedure that is to be performed.” (footnote omitted). This article does not address the specialized is-
sues that the area of medical consent may present. See also Mendelson, supra note 28, at 31 (“[U]nless 
the circumstances of emergency apply, a medical or surgical procedure that goes beyond the scope of a 
patient's express consent should be regarded as trespass, even when there was no evidence of an express 
prohibition.”) (footnote omitted). 
60 Some treat secondary implied assumption of risk as a kind of comparative fault. See 57B AM. JUR. 2D 
NEGLIGENCE § 9 § 764 “Secondary Assumption of Risk” (2d ed. 1962) (“In some jurisdictions, the af-
firmative defense of assumption of risk merges into the general scheme of liability assessment in which 
the conduct of the parties must be compared based on evidence of negligence and contributory negli-
gence, as established by reasonable and prudent person standards.”). See e.g., Perez v. McConkey, 872 
S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tenn. 1994) (“When plaintiff's decision to take risk is unreasonable, secondary as-
sumption of risk is indistinguishable from contributory negligence, and should only reduce, not pre-
clude, recovery under comparative fault analysis.”). 
61 Dan B. Dobbs, et. al., supra note 13, at 218 (“Actual consent to an act is a subjective willingness for 
the act to occur.”). 
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son’s actions or conduct manifest a willingness to subject themselves 
to conduct by another, which, absent consent, would be an intention-
al Tort (e.g., such as assault or battery);62 and 3) “Implied Consent,” 
which occurs in certain circumstances, such as an emergency (e.g., 
“a physician…has implied consent to deliver medical services, in-
cluding surgical procedures, to a patient in an emergency”63).  
At this juncture, it is important to note that Contract law also rec-
ognizes three basic types of contracts: 1) “Express Contracts,” which 
occur when the parties manifest their intent to be bound by an 
agreement by words, either written or verbal;64 2) “Implied in Fact 
Contracts,” which occur when the parties manifest their intent to be 
bound by an agreement by conduct (e.g., a seller shipping goods to a 
buyer or a buyer sending payment to a seller);65 and 3) “Implied in 
Law Contracts,” which occur when the circumstances are such that, 
for policy reasons, our legal system recognizes the existence of a 
contract in order to prevent unfairness and to promote justice (e.g., 
instances where Contract law protects a party’s restitutionary inter-
est).66 
                                                 
62 See id. (“Apparent consent is conduct, including words, that are reasonably understood by another as 
a reflection of consent.”) (footnote to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892); Moore, supra note 
10, at 1627–28 (“[T]he apparent consent doctrine is necessary for the defendant to avoid liability in 
situations where the defendant mistakenly, but reasonably, believes that the plaintiff has consented.”) 
(footnote omitted); Simons, supra note 5, at 217 (“Doctrinally, the question is whether the plaintiff has 
actually or apparently consented to the harm.”) (footnote omitted). 
63 W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 6, at 117 (footnote omitted). See also Tom W. Bell, Graduated 
Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of Justification, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 17, 34 
(2010). Professor Bell uses the terms “express, implied, and hypothetical.” Unfortunately, he uses the 
word “implied” to refer to what traditionally has been called “apparent” and he uses the word “hypo-
thetical” to refer to what has traditionally been called “implied.” But he does not explain to the reader 
that he has consciously changed the labels. Nevertheless, functionally, Professor Bell’s “implied” cate-
gory is the same as what this Article calls “implied in fact” and his “hypothetical” category corresponds 
to what this Article calls “implied in law.” 
64 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 cmt. a. “How a Promise is Made” (1981); 1 
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:5 “Express contracts including contracts inferred or implied in fact” 
(4th ed.); 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 12 “Generally” (2d ed. 1962). See e.g., Alexander v. O'Neil, 
267 P.2d 730, 734 (Ariz. 1954) (“An express contract is ordinarily thought of as an actual agreement 
reached by the parties who have openly uttered or declared terms thereof at the time of making it, either 
orally or in writing.”). 
65 See 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:5 “Express contracts including contracts inferred or implied in 
fact” (4th ed.) (“Although no words of promise or agreement are used, such transactions are true con-
tracts and may properly be called "inferred contracts" or "contracts implied in fact.””). See e.g., Balti-
more & O.R. Co. v. U.S., 261 U.S. 592, 598 (1923) (“An agreement will not be implied in fact, unless 
there was a meeting of the minds of the parties, indicated by some intelligible conduct, act, or sign.”). 
66 See Bell, supra note 63, at 46 (“Contract law…places the three main types of consent – express, im-
plied, and hypothetical – into an ordered ranking, ranging from most consent rich to the least.”). 
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B. Zooming Out to Focus on Goals  
It is useful first to zoom out, assess, and comprehend the big pic-
ture of what these legal doctrines are meant to achieve. In other 
words, we need to articulate the goal or goals in order to determine 
whether our legal rules are designed in such a way that we actually 
are likely to accomplish that goal or those goals.  The bottom-line 
goal of the doctrines of assumption of risk, consent, and assessing 
parties’ intent to be bound by contractual obligations is to determine 
whether, between two persons, one is liable to the other for payment 
when later it turns out that the former (the plaintiff) has suffered 
some type of injury – whether physical, emotional, or economic – as 
a result of conduct by the latter (defendant).  As a rule, if the latter 
(the defendant) has acted within the range of conduct that the com-
munity accepts as reasonable under the circumstances, then she (i.e., 
the latter/defendant) ought not be held liable. Ideally, these doctrines 
should protect and balance two interests: 1) the desires of plaintiffs, 
and 2) the actions of defendants, who have acted reasonably in re-
sponse to their perceptions of the desires communicated to them by 
the plaintiffs.  Both are legitimate interests that warrant efforts to 
protect them.  
Ordinarily, when a plaintiff successfully communicates his desires 
to a defendant, our legal system is capable of determining whether a 
defendant ought to be held liable. For example, when a person pur-
chases a ticket to a baseball game, expressly telling the ticket sales-
person (i.e., an agent of the venue operator) that he wants to buy a 
ticket close to first base because he likes to sit close to the action and 
close to an area where foul balls are likely to be hit, the venue opera-
tor ought not be liable if that spectator is injured when struck by a 
foul ball during that game while sitting in his desired seat.  On the 
other hand, presumably the converse is true.  Assume the spectator 
expressly told the ticket salesperson that he wanted to purchase a 
ticket for a seat that was further away from the playing field, shield-
ed by protective netting, because he was fearful of being struck and 
injured by a foul ball.  Assume also that the ticket salesperson, in 
contravention of the express desires of the spectator, sells to that 
spectator a ticket for a seat in the first row, close to first base, with 
no protective netting or screening of any kind.  And also assume that 
this spectator makes his way to his seat (following the directions of 
the seat number printed on the ticket and instructions by an usher), 
but that, just as he is about to sit and before he has become aware of 
the location of the seat and its proximity to the playing field (and be-
fore a reasonable person in his situation would have become aware), 
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a foul ball strikes and injures him.  In this scenario, a reasonable per-
son in the position of the ticket salesperson would not have sold a 
ticket to the spectator for that seat.  This is because the spectator ex-
pressly communicated his unwillingness to assume/undertake the 
risks of sitting in a vulnerable location.  Because the salesperson’s 
conduct was unreasonable, the venue operator (i.e., the employer of 
the ticket salesperson) should be liable for the injuries caused when 
the foul ball struck the plaintiff.67  
Simply stated, and it bears repeating, when a plaintiff successfully 
communicates his desires in a manner that a reasonable person ought 
to comprehend (i.e., whether a willingness or unwillingness to under-
take the risks of the potential negligence of others, the risks of poten-
tial, intentional assault and/or battery, or the risks that flow from 
agreeing to contract obligations), our legal doctrines have little or no 
difficulty determining whether to impose liability.  The problems 
arise when there is a lack of correlation, or disconnect, between a 
plaintiff’s desires (i.e., inner, subjective thoughts) and the percep-
tions of those desires by a reasonable person in the position of a de-
fendant.68    
These doctrines start from the premise that, when a plaintiff under-
stands the nature and scope of the risks involved in a situation, but 
willingly decides to take his chances – and effectively communicates 
that willingness in a manner that a reasonable person would compre-
hend that willingness – by undertaking the risks of participation (e.g., 
playing a game, watching a game, agreeing to terms, conditions, and 
obligations in a contract), then a defendant, who is also involved in 
the activity along with the plaintiff (e.g., a co-participant, official, the 
other contracting party) ought not be liable to the plaintiff when the 
plaintiff’s injury is caused by a risk within the nature and scope of 
risks comprehended by the plaintiff.    
Let us remember that, whether we are talking about Torts or Con-
tracts, there are essentially two related, relevant factual issues.  We 
are trying to determine what subjective thoughts the injured party en-
tertained and also what thoughts a reasonable person in the position 
of the party who inflicted the injury ought to have entertained.  Both 
are relevant to determine liability, whether in Tort or Contract.  Nev-
ertheless, in close cases, arguably the thoughts entertained by a rea-
sonable person in the position of an injurer are more important than 
                                                 
67 See Simons, supra note 5, at 279 (discussing the limited duty rule applicable to situations where a 
spectator is injured by a foul ball at a baseball park). 
68 See Simons, supra note 5, at 251–52 (“Is plaintiff barred if a reasonable defendant would believe that 
plaintiff assumed the risk, even if plaintiff did not actually consent?”) (footnote omitted). Unfortunately, 
Professor Simons, himself, conflates “assumption of risk” and “consent” terminology. 
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the thoughts of an injured party.  And it should be stressed that the 
subjective thoughts of the parties are not as important as the thoughts 
that a reasonable person in their positions ought to have entertained, 
based on the words and conduct of the other persons involved, cou-
pled with the circumstances.  Because humans are not mind readers, 
our legal system requires only that we act in accordance with the way 
that a reasonable person under similar circumstances would respond.  
As Professor Wright has observed, “there are persuasive arguments 
that legal doctrines should not invariably or uncritically serve a per-
son's subjective desires.”69   
External stimuli bombard our senses with information.  We pro-
cess information only through our five senses: sight, hearing, touch, 
taste, and smell.  Thus, as a rule, in order to assess whether a per-
son’s actions are reasonable, we must first determine what stimuli he 
perceived.  What did that person see, hear, smell, taste, or feel?  Only 
when we know those things can we then assess whether their actions 
were reasonable in light of their situation.  Only then can we deter-
mine whether that person’s conduct was within the range of accepta-
ble conduct that would have been taken by a hypothetical, reasonable 
person under those, or similar, circumstances.  
To be sure, a person’s subjective thoughts may, and often do, in-
fluence the perceptions of others.  Some people are able to “hide 
their feelings” better than others. But there is not always a direct, 
positive correlation between a person’s inner thoughts and their 
words, facial expressions, body language, or otherwise.  There are 
times when a reasonable person misinterprets or misperceives the in-
tentions of others.  And, as a rule, when a reasonable person would 
misinterpret or misperceive the intentions of another, our legal sys-
tem refuses to impose liability on a person who has acted in accord-
ance with that reasonable misinterpretation or misperception.  Why?  
Because, again, as a rule, our legal system takes the position that we 
only expect people to act reasonably, not as super-humans with mind 
reading capabilities.70 So jurors are left to judge whether parties have 
acted reasonably in light of the information (i.e., external stimuli) 
available to their (i.e., the parties’) senses at the time of their actions. 
To a large degree, as has been mentioned, both Contract and Tort 
litigation requires decision makers to determine whether defendants 
must pay plaintiffs money.  Also to a large degree, that decision de-
                                                 
69 Wright, supra note 49, at 1398. See also Simons, supra note 5, at 253 (“[A]pparent consent and ap-
parent assumption of risk are equally sound doctrines.”). 
70 See Bell, supra note 63, at 24 (“[E]ven the most powerful prosecutor can make no pretense of reading 
minds, but instead must rely on the observable, external manifestations of mental states.”). 
2016] CONSENT IN SPORTS & RECREATIONAL ACTIVITIES 21 
 
pends on how decision makers interpret the meaning and content of 
communications that occurred at some time in the past between or 
among the plaintiffs and defendants.  For the sake of example, let us 
consider how these factual inquiries might play out in a putative con-
tract offer-and-acceptance. In order to be bound by a contract, both 
offeror and offeree must manifest their intent to be bound.71 When an 
offeror communicates an offer, it is the act of communication that 
manifests her intention to be bound, or not, to a contract.  And when 
an offeree communicates either acceptance or rejection of the offe-
ror’s offer, it is that act of communication that manifests her inten-
tion to be bound to a contract.  Whether the parties have manifested 
an intent to be bound depends on their verbal and non-verbal con-
duct, and also the surrounding circumstances (e.g., prior conduct and 
interactions of the parties and industry customs).  As a rule, neither 
putative offeror nor putative offeree can be liable for breach of con-
tract if she did not manifest an intent to be bound.72   
In the law of Torts, a defendant is liable for damages for the inten-
tional tort of battery when he intentionally causes harmful or offen-
sive contact with a plaintiff.73  However, if a plaintiff has consented 
to the harmful or offensive contact, a defendant is not liable for a 
plaintiff’s injuries caused by the harmful or offensive contact.74 For 
example, as a rule, when a boxer hits his opponent in the ring, he is 
not liable for his opponent’s injury caused by the blow.  Boxers con-
                                                 
71 See 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 3:2 “Requirements for informal contracts” (4th ed.). See e.g., Cox 
Broad. Corp. v. Natl. Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 297 S.E.2d 733, 737 (Ga. 1982) (“In determining if par-
ties had the mutual assent or meeting of the minds necessary to reach agreement, courts apply an objec-
tive theory of intent whereby one party's intention is deemed to be that meaning a reasonable man in the 
position of the other contracting party would ascribe to the first party's manifestations of assent, or that 
meaning which the other contracting party knew the first party ascribed to his manifestations of as-
sent.”) (footnotes omitted). 
72 See 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1:3 “Agreement” (4th ed.) (“As is true with respect to promises, 
the nature of agreement requires a manifestation of mutual assent, and the concept of manifestation 
generally requires an objective indicium of mutual assent.”). See e.g., Situation Mgt. Sys., Inc. v. 
Malouf, Inc., 724 N.E.2d 699, 703 (Mass. 2000) (“It is axiomatic that to create an enforceable contract, 
there must be agreement between the parties on the material terms of that contract, and the parties must 
have a present intention to be bound by that agreement.”). 
73 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 13 “Battery: Harmful Contact” (1965); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 “Battery: Offensive Contact” (1965). 
74 See id. (“Plaintiff's consent to the contact with his person will prevent the liability.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 892, cmt. b. “Meaning of Consent” (1979) (“Consent means that the person con-
cerned is in fact willing for the conduct of another to occur. Normally this willingness is manifested 
directly to the other by words or acts that are intended to indicate that it exists. It need not, however, be 
so manifested by words or by affirmative action. It may equally be manifested by silence or inaction, if 
the circumstances or other evidence indicate that the silence or inaction is intended to give consent. 
Even without a manifestation, consent may be proved by any competent evidence to exist in fact, and 
when so proved it is as effective as if manifested.”) 
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sent to subject themselves to blows from their opponents.75 Boxers 
may communicate their consent by verbal conduct, non-verbal con-
duct, or consent may be inferred by industry custom.76 Prosser’s trea-
tise illustrates this principle by specifically mentioning sports: “One 
who enters into a sport, game or contest may be taken to consent to 
the physical contacts consistent with the understood rules of the 
game.”77 Thus, like Contract offeror and offeree, liability for an in-
tentional Tort such as battery may depend on whether a plaintiff has 
communicated consent.        
Communication, by definition, is a two-way street.  Communica-
tion involves an act or acts by one party coupled with a perception of 
that act or those acts by another.  Most legal rules relating to com-
municative acts are based on the presumption that the meanings that 
we attach to communicative acts ought to be the meanings that a rea-
sonable person under similar circumstances ought to have attached to 
such communicative acts.  Thus, when a putative offeror says to an 
offeree: “I offer to buy your cow for $500,” whether a reasonable 
person in the position of the offeree would interpret the offeror’s 
statement as a manifestation of assent to be bound by that offer de-
pends on a number of factors.  For example, the offeror’s tone of 
voice, facial expressions, body language, hand motions, and other 
surrounding circumstances affect whether a reasonable person in the 
position of the offeree ought to interpret the offeror’s offer as a genu-
ine manifestation of his intent to be bound.  Thus, suppose that a pu-
tative offeror is secretly, subjectively thinking to himself “I don’t 
want to buy this guy’s cow; I wouldn’t buy this cow even for $10.”  
But if that putative offeror says: “I offer to buy your cow for $500,” 
and if he says that in a conversational, earnest tone of voice, with a 
look of genuine honesty in his eyes and hands calmly folded, absent 
other contradictory evidence (e.g., perhaps such as a previous course 
of dishonest dealings between the parties), a reasonable person in the 
position of the putative offeree would interpret the putative offer as a 
genuine offer to buy, notwithstanding the putative offeror’s secret, 
                                                 
75 See e.g., W. Page Keeton et. al.,  supra note 6, at 113 (“This manifestation of willingness can exist 
even when the plaintiff hopes to avoid the invasion, such as some harmful invasion in a sporting contest 
or a fist fight, and certainly does not want or desire any such invasion.”). See also Moore, supra note 
10, at 1617 (“[A] defendant who engages in a boxing match under the mistaken impression that the 
plaintiff consented has the requisite intent to harm when he punches the plaintiff in the jaw, desiring to 
knock him to the floor. The defendant will be liable if he is mistaken as to his opponent's consent, and 
his mistake is an unreasonable one.”) (footnote omitted). 
76 W. Page Keeton et. al., supra note 6, at 113 (“The defendant is sometimes at liberty to infer consent 
as a matter of usage or custom and to proceed upon the assumption that it is given.”). 
77 Id. at 114. 
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subjective thoughts to the contrary.78                                        
Absent persuasive, contradictory evidence, reasonable people pre-
sume that the outward manifestations of a person’s words and con-
duct correspond to his subjective thoughts.79 The same analysis gov-
erns whether a putative offeree’s words or conduct legally operate as 
an acceptance.  If a reasonable person in the position of the offeror 
would interpret the offeree’s words and/or conduct as manifesting an 
intent to accept the offeror’s offer, then, as a rule, our legal system 
treats those words and/or conduct as creating an obligation by the of-
feree to sell (i.e., as an acceptance of the offeror’s offer).  The offer-
ee’s words and/or conduct may create such an obligation even if the 
offeree secretly, subjectively is thinking “No I wouldn’t sell my cow 
for less than $1,000. 
C. Isolating the Questions & Trouble with Terminology of 
Categories 
1. Overview 
Thus far, this Article has suggested that three analogous, legal sit-
uations involve the same three questions.  The three analogous, legal 
situations are: 1) whether a person (i.e., plaintiff) has assumed the 
risks of another’s (i.e., defendant) negligence; 2) whether a person 
(i.e., plaintiff) has consented to the risks that flow from another’s 
(i.e., defendant) intentional tort (i.e., in particular assault and bat-
tery); and, 3) whether a person (i.e., plaintiff) has assented to be 
bound in a contractual obligation with another (i.e., defendant).  The 
three questions that a fact finder must determine to assess a defend-
ant’s liability vel non in these situations are: 1) what the plaintiff’s 
subjective desires were at the time of engaging in an activity; 2) what 
a reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have per-
ceived the plaintiff’s desires to be; and 3) whether the defendant’s 
                                                 
78 See e.g., E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 3.10 “What is an Offer” at 137 (2d ed. 1990) (“Un-
der the objective theory the issue then becomes whether the one to whom the proposal was made had 
reason to believe that it was intended as an offer.”) (footnote omitted).  See also Mendelson, supra note 
28, at 24 (“Originally, the law emphasized the consensus of mind by the contracting parties as an indi-
cation of true consent. This approach was known as the ‘subjective theory’ of contract. Today the pre-
ferred doctrine is the ‘objective theory,’ whereby the law is less concerned with the true intentions of 
the parties and more with outward manifestations of those intentions.  Eventually, the nature of consent 
within the physician-patient relationship would come to be examined in the light of this modern theo-
ry.”) (footnote omitted). 
79 But Professor Wright warns: “[M]ore often than the law recognizes, apparent consent really does not 
reflect the degree of knowledge and freedom necessary to validate a transaction.” Wright, supra note 
49, at 1413. 
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conduct was reasonable in light of the perceptions of a reasonable 
person regarding the desires of the plaintiff.  Now consider again the 
traditional categories that Tort and Contract law have established to 
analyze these three situations.  
Assumption of risk has been sub-categorized into: 1) Express; 2) 
Secondary Implied; and 3) Primary Implied. A plaintiff expressly as-
sumes risks when his communicative acts – presumably written, ver-
bal, or otherwise – indicate his desire to undertake an activity even 
though he knows that the activity may pose certain risks of injury.  A 
plaintiff assumes risks via secondary implied assumption of risk 
when he comprehends the general nature and scope of risks posed by 
an activity but, nevertheless, engages in that activity, knowing those 
risks.80 A person assumes the risks inherent in an activity by means 
of primary implied assumption of risk, whether the person subjec-
tively is aware of those risks or not.  
Consent has been sub-categorized into: 1) Actual Consent; 2) Ap-
parent Consent; and 3) Implied Consent.  A person consents to bat-
tery81 through so-called actual consent when he subjectively desires 
to subject himself to another’s harmful or offensive contact. Accord-
ing to Dobbs, “[a]ctual consent to an act is a subjective willingness 
for the act to occur.”82 And Prosser notes: “Actual willingness, estab-
lished by competent evidence, will prevent liability….”83 “Apparent 
consent is conduct, including words, that are reasonably understood 
by another as a reflection of consent.”84 Professor Moore explains: 
“[T]he doctrine of apparent consent would also exonerate defendants 
who make reasonable mistakes but not those whose mistakes are un-
reasonable.”85 Consent is deemed implied when, for policy reasons, 
the circumstances (e.g., an emergency situation where the plaintiff 
was rendered unconscious and cannot communicate) dictate that a 
defendant (e.g., such as a physician rendering emergency medical 
                                                 
80 See  W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 6, § 68, 484–92 (Assumption of Risk). 
81 Although intentional torts, other than battery – such as assault or trespass to land – may also be ne-
gated by consent, for the sake of simplicity and clarity, from this point forward, the Article will use bat-
tery as the primary example.  
82 Dan B. Dobbs et. al., supra note 13, at 218. 
83 W. Page Keeton et. al., supra note 6, at 113. 
84 Dan B. Dobbs et. al, supra note 13, at 218 (footnote to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892) 
(italics added). 
85 Moore, supra note 10, at 1628 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 1650 (“Section 892 of the Second 
Restatement…provides that consent can be either actual or apparent and that apparent consent consists 
of ‘words or conduct [that] are reasonably understood . . . to be intended as consent.’”) (n. 376 quoting 
the Restatement: “Actors such as physicians are also privileged in emergency circumstances in which 
the actor has no reason to believe that the other person would, if asked, refuse to consent.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2) (1979)).  
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treatment to an automobile accident victim) is excused or justified in 
what otherwise would be considered a harmful or offensive touching 
(i.e., battery).86 Professor Moore weighs in on this issue: 
 
It is not clear that defendants should be required, in all 
cases, to determine consent solely on the basis of the 
plaintiff's own words or conduct. Perhaps defendants 
should be permitted to act when, under all of the circum-
stances, they reasonably believe that a plaintiff with the 
capacity to do so has consented to the contact.87  
 
Contracts also may be subcategorized into: 1) Express; 2) Implied 
in Fact; and, 3) Implied in Law.  Express contracts are those where 
the offeror and offeree manifest an intent to be bound by their written 
or verbal communications.  A contract is implied in fact when the 
non-verbal conduct of the parties implies that the offeror and offeree 
intend to be bound.  “A contract, implied in fact, is an actual contract 
which arises where the parties agree upon the obligations to be in-
curred, but their intention, instead of being expressed in words, is in-
ferred from their acts in light of the surrounding circumstances.”88 
And a contract is implied in law when the words or conduct of the 
parties fail to indicate that the parties manifest an intent to be bound 
by an agreement, but other circumstances, for reasons of policy, 
make it unjust not to impose some degree of liability (e.g., to prevent 
“unjust enrichment”).  
Thus, even though the goals of determining liability in all three le-
gal situations are the same, Tort and Contract laws have evolved in 
such a way that we have created three different, and in some re-
                                                 
86 See e.g., Mendelson, supra note 28, at 31 (“The legal justification for the emergency exception to the 
law of consent when applied to unconscious patients has changed from that of implied consent to the 
principle of necessity – the medical intervention must be shown to have been necessary ‘for the protec-
tion of the plaintiff's health and possibly his life.”) (footnote omitted); Vincent R. Johnson and Alan 
Gunn, Studies in American Tort Law 139 (4th ed. 2009) (“In the absence of actual or apparent consent, 
special circumstances such as medical emergency may make it desirable for a person to engage in con-
duct that would otherwise be tortuous. In such instances, the law holds that consent is implied because 
the interests to be furthered by the invasion (e.g., preservation of life or limb) are more important than 
those which will be sacrificed (e.g., bodily integrity and freedom from unconsented contact). In such 
instances there is really no consent at all, actual or apparent, only a legal fiction called implied con-
sent, which completely bars liability.”) (italics added).   
87 Moore, supra note 10, at 1652 (footnote omitted). See also Mendelson, supra note 28, at 30–31 
(“[T]he law may imply consent in circumstances where a person is injured to the extent of being ren-
dered unconscious and the injuries require prompt medical attention. Under these conditions, ‘a physi-
cian . . . would be justified in applying such medical or surgical treatment as might reasonably be neces-
sary for the preservation of the injured person's life or limb. “) (footnote omitted). 
88 In re Home Prot. Bldg. & Loan Ass’n, 17 A.2d 755, 756 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941). 
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spects, inconsistent, vocabularies to articulate those modes of analy-
sis. The balance of this Part of the Article suggests that Tort law will 
be better served if we borrow Contract law’s terminology/vocabulary 
to analyze both assumption of risk and consent. Consistent legal vo-
cabulary and a consistent analytical framework for evaluating analo-
gous legal problems can provide significant advantages. Adopting a 
uniform vocabulary and analysis will reduce confusion, increase the 
likelihood of consistency, and increase the likelihood of achieving 
just results.89 
2. Express 
The word “express” is a good word to use to characterize commu-
nication that uses language, expressed either verbally or in writing.  
Thus, when a putative plaintiff verbally or in writing communicates 
his desires in a manner that expresses a willingness to undertake an 
activity, despite the potential risks involved in that activity, it is best 
for the legal system to accept that communication as true.  Fraud, 
misrepresentation, or coercion on the part of another may serve to 
cancel the validity of such an express communication, but arguably 
fraud, misrepresentation, or coercion are best treated as evidence that 
can rebut the presumption established by an express communica-
tion.90 Hence, when a putative plaintiff uses verbal or written lan-
                                                 
89 See Simons, supra note 5, at 280 (“[I]t might be well to discard the nomenclature of ‘assumption of 
risk,’ with its multiple and mainly unacceptable meanings.”).  
90 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B “Meaning of Consent” (1979) (“Consent to conduct 
of another is effective for all consequences of the conduct and for the invasion of any interests resulting 
from it. If the person consenting to the conduct of another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake 
concerning the nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to be expected from it 
and the mistake is known to the other or is induced by the other's misrepresentation, the consent is not 
effective for the unexpected invasion or harm. Consent is not effective if it is given under duress.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B, cmt. a. “Consent Under Mistake, Misrepresentation or Du-
ress” (1979) (“This Section is concerned only with the effect of fraud, mistake or duress as invalidating 
the consent, rendering it ineffective and entitling the plaintiff to maintain any tort action that would be 
available to him if the consent had not been given. Thus if he is induced by the fraud, mistake or duress 
to consent to a harmful or offensive contact with his person, he may maintain an action for battery.”) 
Id.; 13 Am. Jur. 2d Cancellation of Instruments § 13 (2d ed.) (“A party may seek judicial cancellation 
or rescission of an instrument based on the other party's misrepresentation or fraud. Whether a misrepre-
sentation gives rise to a cause of action for rescission depends upon the materiality of representation in 
circumstances of the particular case. A misrepresentation in a contract is material if it would likely in-
duce a reasonable person to manifest his or her assent to the contract.”) (footnotes omitted). See e.g., 
Liborio v. King, 564 S.E.2d 272, 275 (N.C. App. 2002) (“Proof of misrepresentation is rebuttal to pre-
sumption of validity of written consent to medical treatment, and does not outright invalidate consent as 
a matter of law.”); Duncan v. Scottsdale Med. Imaging, Ltd., 70 P.3d 435, 441 (Ariz. 2003) (“Allega-
tions that patient on three separate occasions told nurse allegedly employed by medical imaging provid-
er that patient would only accept an injection of one of two specified painkillers in connection with 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) examination, and that nurse told patient the medication had been 
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guage to communicate that he intends to assume the risks of negli-
gence, consents to the risks of battery, or assents to the risks of con-
tractual terms and obligations (e.g., market price fluctuation), we can 
refer to these express communications respectively as: “express as-
sumption of risk;” “express consent;”91 and, “express intent to be 
bound.”  
Absent competent evidence that disproves the validity of such ex-
press communications – or other compelling public policy reasons – 
we ought to enforce the validity of desires expressed by competent 
individuals who have gone to the trouble of expressing themselves 
using the convention of language – either in writing or orally – to 
communicate those desires to others.  Reasonable persons are enti-
tled to perceive that others intend to communicate their thoughts and 
desires truthfully by means of language, expressed either in writing 
or orally.  This contention derives from the logical premise that peo-
ple earnestly communicate in good faith, and that there is a high, re-
liable correlation between a person’s thoughts (e.g., desires) and their 
written or verbal expressions of those thoughts.  
Express assumption of risk (e.g., a standard waiver of liability of 
the sort signed by skiers), express consent (e.g., a consent form 
signed by someone participating in an intramural boxing competi-
tion), and an express contract (e.g., a written contract such as a real 
estate purchase-and-sale contract) constitute sound examples.  Con-
tract law has taught us that, as a rule, legal analysis is best served 
when we begin our inquiry regarding contract interpretation by care-
fully considering the specific language of the contract itself.  That, 
for example, is why we have the parol evidence rule.92 The same 
general principle operates in statutory construction; we start our 
analysis with the language (i.e., the words of the statute).93 A legal 
                                                                                                                
changed to one of those painkillers but proceeded to administer a different one, supported battery claim 
against provider on theory that provider obtained patient's consent for injection by express misrepresen-
tation.”)  
91 See Bell, supra note 63, at 35–37. Interestingly, Professor Bell uses the term “express consent” but 
fails to acknowledge that traditional Tort law does not use that term. He cites the Second Restatement 
of Torts § 10A as the source for his definition. But the Restatement does not use that term; it merely 
defines “consent” not using the phrase “express consent.”   
92 See 29A AM. JUR. 2D EVIDENCE § 1104 “Parol or Extrinsic Evidence Affecting Writings” (2d ed.) 
(“The parol-evidence rule generally precludes the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the 
terms of an unambiguous and integrated contract. Indeed, where a contract is integrated, no extrinsic 
evidence of prior or contemporaneous agreements will be admissible to change, alter, or contradict the 
contractual writing. In other words, where the parties have concluded a valid integrated agreement with 
respect to a particular subject matter, the parol-evidence rule precludes the enforcement of inconsistent 
prior or contemporaneous agreements. Thus, the parol-evidence rule generally prohibits the introduction 
of evidence that tends to alter an integrated written document.”) (footnotes omitted). 
93 See 73 AM. JUR. 2D STATUTES § 106 “Adherence to or Departure from Statute as Enacted” (2d ed.) 
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regime that adopts the concept of “express assumption of risk” would 
encompass situations where a putative plaintiff explicitly acknowl-
edges and accepts the risks of negligence through written or oral lan-
guage.  There are, in fact, some jurisdictions that currently employ 
this terminology.94 “Express consent,” in like manner, would arise 
when a consenting party expresses his willingness to incur another’s 
intentional harmful or offensive contact by means of written or oral 
communication. 
3. Implied in Fact 
Secondly, the Contract term “implied in fact” ought to be used to 
refer to situations where the conduct (i.e., non-verbal actions or inac-
tions) of the putative plaintiff indicate that he has assumed a risk, 
consented to battery, and/or agreed to the terms and conditions of a 
contract. As has been explained,95 Contract law employs the term 
“implied in fact” in this manner. When the conduct of the parties is 
sufficient to prove mutual assent, the law embraces the implication 
of their conduct. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides 
that, “[a] promise ... may be inferred wholly or partly from con-
duct.”96 Comment A to the Restatement (Second) states: 
 
Contracts are often spoken of as express or implied. The 
distinction involves, however, no difference in legal ef-
fect, but merely in the mode of manifesting assent. Just 
as assent may be manifested by words or other conduct, 
sometimes including silence, so intention to make a 
promise may be manifested in language or by implica-
tion from other circumstances, including course of deal-
ing or usage of trade or course of performance.97  
                                                                                                                
(“If the statutory language is unambiguous, in the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intent to the 
contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. In this regard, it has been stated that 
the legislative intent of Congress is to be derived from the language and structure of the statute itself, if 
possible, not from assertions of codifiers directly at odds with the clear statutory language. The courts 
may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words in the applicable stat-
utes.”) (footnotes omitted);  
See e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (“It is cardinal principle of statutory construc-
tion that statute should, upon the whole, be construed so that, if possible, no clause, sentence or word is 
rendered superfluous, void or insignificant.”). 
94 See e.g., Coleman v. Ramada Hotel Operating Co., 933 F.2d 470 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying Illinois 
law, remarking: “Express assumption of risk demands an explicit agreement...”). 
95 See supra Part III, Section A. 
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 (1979). 
97 Id. § 4 cmt. a. 
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The venerable provision in the Uniform Commercial Code, § 2–
207(3), provides an apt example, where the conduct of the parties is 
statutorily recognized as sufficient to establish the existence of a con-
tract in situations where the express language of the parties has failed 
to do so.98 The Uniform Commercial Code’s § 1–303 provides an-
other illustration, where the course of dealing and course of perfor-
mance (i.e., prior conduct of the parties) is considered valid evidence 
of the parties’ intent.99 
Take a moment to consider how the term “implied in fact” might 
improve our analysis of assumption of risk. One difficulty in as-
sessing secondary implied assumption of risk is that a fact finder is 
required to determine whether a plaintiff, in fact, knew, understood, 
and appreciated the nature and scope of risks involved in any given 
activity.100 In the absence of an assumption of risk expressed through 
written or oral language, proving the subjective knowledge of a puta-
tive plaintiff’s understanding of risks is fraught with difficulty. Ra-
ther than trying to investigate the secret, inner thoughts of a partici-
pant, if Tort law were to recognize assumption of risk as “implied in 
fact” in circumstances where his conduct is indicative of his assump-
tion of risk (i.e., through circumstantial evidence based on a putative 
plaintiff’s conduct), a fact finder will have better tools to make such 
                                                 
98 See U.C.C. § 2–207(3) (Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation) (“Conduct by both parties 
which recognizes the existence of a contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although the 
writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract. In such case the terms of the particular con-
tract consist of those terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with any supplementary 
terms incorporated under any other provisions of this Act.”). 
99 See U.C.C. § 1–303(d) (Course of Performance, Course of Dealing, and Usage of Trade) (“A course 
of performance or course of dealing between the parties or usage of trade in the vocation or trade in 
which they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware is relevant in ascertaining the meaning 
of the parties' agreement, may give particular meaning to specific terms of the agreement, and may sup-
plement or qualify the terms of the agreement. A usage of trade applicable in the place in which part of 
the performance under the agreement is to occur may be so utilized as to that part of the performance.”). 
100 See 30 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 161 § 1 (Introduction and Scope) (Originally published in 1995) 
(“Sports cases have tended to depart from the traditional definition containing the subjective element of 
plaintiff's knowledge, favoring instead the legal issue of the defendant's duty of care. This view elimi-
nates the variable factors such as the plaintiff's subjective knowledge and expectations, which the de-
fendant would have no way of ascertaining.”); See e.g., Foronda ex rel. Est. of Foronda v. Hawaii In-
tern. Boxing Club, 25 P.3d 826, 843 (Haw. App. 2001) (“The very concept of inherent risk implies 
indwelling risk independent of the participant's subjective knowledge or perception of it… The inquiry 
is an objective one, and must be, for the vagaries of prior knowledge or perception of risk would un-
dermine the doctrine's underlying policy, that 'the law should not place unreasonable burdens on the 
free and vigorous participation in sports[.]”) (citing Turcotte v. Fell, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49, 502 N.E.2d at 
968); Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 969 (N.Y. 1986) (“Question of whether consent of participant in 
sporting event to risks of event was informed includes consideration of participant's knowledge and 
experience in activity generally, with professional athlete being manifestly more aware of dangers of 
activity and presumably more willing to accept them in exchange for salary than amateur.”).  
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an evaluation.  
The traditional category of “apparent consent” appears to be anal-
ogous, at least partially, to the Contract concept of “implied in fact.” 
The time-honored case, O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co.101 states the rule 
simply:  
 
If the plaintiff’s behavior was such as to indicate consent 
on her part, he [i.e., the doctor who vaccinated the plain-
tiff] was justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed 
feelings may have been. In determining whether she 
consented, he could be guided only by her overt acts and 
the manifestation of her feelings.102  
 
Dobbs explains this principle:  
 
Because the appearance of consent is effective if it leads 
the defendant reasonably to believe consent is actual, a 
plaintiff’s private and uncommunicated reservation does 
not subject the defendant to liability.  The defendant is 
entitled to rely in good faith upon the reasonable appear-
ance of consent created by the plaintiff.103   
                                                 
101 28 N.E. 266 (Mass. 1891). 
102 Id. See also Dan B. Dobbs et. al., supra note 13, at 217 (“The plaintiff effectively consents if appear-
ances created by her words or acts lead the defendant reasonably to believe she consented, even if the 
plaintiff did not subjectively intend to consent.”) (footnote omitted); id. at 218 (regarding the O’Brien 
case, “the court held that even if she did not subjectively consent, her conduct gave the appearance of 
consent and that the defendant was entitled to rely upon the appearance even if the plaintiff never sub-
jectively meant to consent at all.”) (footnote to O’Brien v. Cunard S.S. Co., 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 
(1891)). See also Simons, supra note 5, at 238–39 (“Consider the well-known consent case, O'Brien v. 
Cunard Steamship Co. The plaintiff, a passenger on a steamship, may have held out her arm to be vac-
cinated only out of terror and fear of quarantine. The court held that her apparent consent barred her 
battery claim. However, let us suppose defendant was aware of her unexpressed fears. Would that un-
dermine the voluntariness of plaintiff's consent? Not under the proposed model, because it was the gov-
ernment's vaccine regulations, not the defendant, that restricted plaintiff's choice. Traditional assump-
tion of risk doctrine apparently takes the same position.”) (footnotes omitted). 
103 Dan B. Dobbs et. al., supra note 13, at 218. See also id. at 219 (“Effective consent can be manifested 
by nonverbal conduct of the plaintiff.  It can be shown by actions, by a course of conduct, by social 
conventions applicable to the setting, or by a relationship between the parties.”) (footnotes omitted). 
Perhaps social conventions applicable to the setting could be either implied in fact or implied in law. 
See also W. Page Keeton et. al., supra note 6, at 113 (“[A] manifestation of consent, upon which the 
defendant may reasonably rely, will be equally effective even though there is no willingness in fact. In 
our society we must perforce rely upon the overt works and acts of others, rather than their undisclosed 
minds. Consent may therefore be manifested by words or by the kinds of actions which often speak 
louder than words. The defendant is entitled to rely upon what any reasonable man would understand 
from the plaintiff’s conduct.”); Moore, supra note 10, at 1628, n. 245 (“[A] defendant may intend to 
harm even though he reasonably believes the plaintiff has consented.”).  
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4. Implied in Law 
Contract law recognizes a contract “implied in law” in situations 
where, for policy reasons, we wish to avoid “unjust enrichment.”104 
It is common to refer to the underlying principle as one that provides 
restitution and one that employs the legal system to require a person 
to “disgorge a benefit.”105 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
notes: “Quasi-contracts have often been called implied contracts or 
contracts implied in law; but, unlike true contracts, quasi-contracts 
are not based on the apparent intention of the parties to undertake the 
performance in question, nor are they promises. They are obligations 
created by law for reasons of justice.”106  “A simple example is the 
claim for the return of money paid by mistake to one to whom it was 
not owed.”107 Professor Farnsworth explains that claims for restitu-
tion based on contracts implied in law will not be enforced when the 
benefit was conferred “officiously,” “gratuitously,” or in a manner 
that is not “measurable.”108 Primarily, then, it is a rule driven by eq-
uitable principles – principles that require courts to intervene in sit-
uations where public policy, “justice,” or “fairness” dictate interven-
tion.109 
Primary implied assumption of risk operates using the same prin-
ciple. And so does “implied consent,” when consent is implied in 
circumstances such as medical emergencies for reasons of jus-
tice/fairness. Prosser explains this principle, saying, “The justifica-
tion is that no reasonable person would object if in a position to 
make a decision.”110 Fairness dictates that the legal system validate 
                                                 
104 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 2.20 “Nature and Role of Restitution” at 102—03 (2d 
ed. 1990). See also Bell, supra note 63, at 39. Professor Bell identifies the same correlation between the 
Contract doctrine of “quasi-contract” and the Tort doctrine of “implied consent” in the context of medi-
cal emergencies. Bell uses the word “hypothetical” to refer to what this Article calls “implied in fact.” 
Again, part of the focus of this Article is to recommend a universal and consistent vocabulary for both 
Contract and Tort in the situations where the terms “express,” “implied in fact,” and “implied in law” 
will assist both lawyers and judges in their efforts to apply consistent methodology to the same underly-
ing principles.   
105 See Farnsworth, supra note 104, at 102–03. 
106 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 4 cmt. b (1997). 
107 Farnsworth, supra note 104, at 103. 
108 Farnsworth, supra note 104, at 104–10. 
109 See e.g., Wright, supra note 49, at 1413 (“[A]ll consumer knowledge is imperfect, and legal doc-
trines such as unconscionability can play an important role.”) (footnote omitted). The doctrine of “un-
conscionability,” like “implied in law,” allows a judge to apply principles of “fairness” to achieve what 
s/he deems to be an equitable result. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2–302.  
110 W. Page Keeton et. al.,, supra note 6, at 118. See also id. at 119 (“It is of course possible that the 
situation may be one of unforeseen emergency, critical in its nature, which will justify the surgeon in 
proceeding on the assumption that the patient would consent if he were conscious and understood the 
situation.”) (footnotes omitted); See Bell, supra note 63, at 39 (“In tort law, physicians rendering emer-
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(or, at the very least, exonerate and not punish) persons such as doc-
tors who perform emergency surgeries, using their professional 
judgment and reason, when confronted by crises or emergency cir-
cumstances, which, by definition, do not provide time sufficient for 
reflection, debate, and/or extensive study and analysis. The mind-
reading, second-guessing, and paternalism that may occasionally be 
necessary in medical emergencies where a conscious patient refuses 
treatment in a time of crisis may be the exception that proves the rule 
relating to objective manifestations of intent serving as the primary 
criteria for determining whether a person intends consent.111 
D. Application of Revised Terminology to Assumption of Risk & 
Consent 
Using traditional Tort categories, professional athletes, who pres-
ently participate in contact sports probably assume risks in three 
ways. First they assume the risk of negligence by others by express 
assumption of risk. For example, they might do so by means of a 
written contract such as a standard player contract or collective bar-
gaining agreement. Second, they might assume risks through sec-
ondary implied assumption of risk. For example, professional ath-
letes, arguably, subjectively are well aware of the nature and scope 
of risks involved in their respective sports. And thirdly, they assume 
risks by application of the doctrine of primary implied assumption of 
risk (i.e., because there are certain risks inherent in their respective 
sports, such as tackle football, ice hockey, and baseball).  
Similarly, under the traditional Tort categories, professional ath-
letes today probably consent to battery in three ways. First, they con-
sent to battery by actual consent, because professional athletes will-
                                                                                                                
gency care on unconscious victims routinely win a defense against battery on grounds that the alleged 
victim would have consented to treatment if he or she had been conscious.”) (footnote omitted) (italics 
original). See also Mendelson, supra note 28, at 19 (“Consent to medical treatment, as we understand 
this concept today, was not specifically articulated in the medical treatises, professional codes, and reg-
ulations of early modern England. Nevertheless, the notion of patient consent to treatment not only as a 
legal requirement but also as an ethical construct must have been appreciated, because its legal and eth-
ical significance within the physician-patient relationship was discussed in the 1767 English case of 
Slater v. Baker & Stapleton.  This case appears to be a first instance in which the court affirmed the 
principle that nonconsensual contact in the context of medical treatment ought to be regarded as a legal 
wrong.”) (footnotes omitted). 
111 See Mendelson, supra note 28, at 48 (“Medicine, and in particular psychiatry, recognizes that such 
factors as the patient's personality, affective disorder, medications, external pressures and the setting, 
may impair clinical competency, leading to a refusal of treatment. Disease is frequently accompanied 
by stress and/or pain, productive of depression, that may impair the patient's ability to function compe-
tently in processing and understanding medical information and making treatment decisions.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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fully and consciously subject themselves to physical contact that is 
harmful or offensive. Also, they consent to battery through apparent 
consent because their participation and movements while engaged in 
their sports constitutes conduct that manifests a willingness to sub-
ject themselves to harmful or offensive contact. In addition, they 
consent with implied consent because the inherent nature of contact 
sports necessitates a certain degree of physical contact.112 
Using the suggested, revised categories, discussed above (i.e., ex-
press, implied in fact, and implied in law), we might also say that to-
day's professional athletes participating in contact sports assume 
risks of unintentional contacts and consent to battery in three ways. 
First, modern professional athletes assume the risks of others’ negli-
gence and consent to harmful or offensive contacts by express as-
sumption of risk and express consent. They do so, for example, by 
written player contracts or collective bargaining agreements. Second-
ly, such professional athletes’ assumption of risk and consent may be 
implied in fact because the conduct of players manifests their will-
ingness to subject themselves to the risk of negligence by others and 
also their willingness to subject themselves to intentional harmful or 
offensive physical contact by others.113 Lastly, their assumption of 
risks and consent may be considered implied in law because the in-
herent nature of contact sports at the professional level requires that 
participants play with a level of intensity that cannot necessarily pre-
vent carelessness and also requires that participants intentionally 
strike co-participants in the course of engaging in such sports.114 But, 
presumably, players neither assume the risk of nor consent to violent 
contacts that are decidedly outside the scope of contact ordinarily 
contemplated by those who participate in such sports.  
To be sure, this may present difficult issues in some sports such as 
professional ice hockey, where even fistfights are considered within 
the normally accepted range of player conduct.115 Even today in 
                                                 
112 See e.g., Dan B. Dobbs et. al., supra note 13, § 96, 219 (Manifestation of Consent, Implied Consent 
by Conduct) (“Perhaps most real-life consent is implied rather than expressed.”) Id. (“We join a game 
of tag; we consent to being touched.”) Id. (“Body language communicates many feelings or attitudes, 
including consents.”) Id. (“Indeed your relationship with your partner might itself demonstrate a general 
consent to friendly touchings.”) Id. 
113 See Moore, supra note 10, at 1652–53 (“So long as the defendant's reliance is reasonable under the 
circumstances, there is no reason why the defendant should be liable in battery.”). 
114 See id. at 1653 (“If a defendant may act reasonably in self-defense, taking into account all of the at-
tendant circumstances, then it is far from clear why consent should be limited to conduct manifested 
only by the words or conduct of the plaintiff.”) (footnotes omitted); id. at 1654 (“[T]here has been little 
examination of the precise contours of the doctrine of consent, particularly the ability of a defendant to 
reasonably rely on circumstances other than the words or conduct of the plaintiff or someone authorized 
to give consent on the plaintiff's behalf.”).  
115 For reasoned discussion of issues related to violence in professional ice hockey, see e.g., Dryden, 
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2016, NHL on-ice officials do not stop fights immediately. They 
watch as combatants drop their gloves and trade blows. Typically the 
on-ice officials intervene only when one player falls to the ice. Clear-
ly, the tacit understanding is that fistfights between players are ac-
cepted as “part of the game” by NHL executives, coaches, officials, 
and players. Thus, players must legally be deemed to have consented 
to the injuries that result from such fights. Using traditional Tort vo-
cabulary, we would say that they both actually consent and apparent-
ly consent. Using the vocabulary suggested in this Article, we would 
say that their consent is both implied in fact and implied in law.        
E. Mistake or Fraud Invalidates Consent 
It is well settled that mistake by a plaintiff or fraud by a defendant 
may vitiate a plaintiff’s consent.116 Prosser explains this principle: 
 
                                                                                                                
supra note 4, at 214–17 (discussing the phenomenon of fighting in the NHL); id. at 216 (“The NHL is 
wrong. **** The NHL theory of violence is nothing more than original violence tolerated and accepted, 
in time turned into custom, into spectacle, into tactic, and finally into theory. For years the league has 
argued the wrong-headedness of its critics, and for years it has missed the point. Surely it matters little 
any more whether hockey fighting is violence or vaudeville, release or just good practice. What matters 
is that fighting degrades, turning sport into dubious spectacle, bringing into question hockey’s very le-
gitimacy, confining it forever to the fringes of sports respectability.”); id. at 224 (commenting on the 
brutal tactics of the “Broadstreet Bullies” era of the Philadelphia Flyers in the mid-1970’s, and the 
NHL’s acquiescence to fighting and unprovoked violence, Dryden remarks: “Penalized more than any-
one else but far less than they might be, with the league as unintended co-conspirator, they benefited 
hugely from the informal penalty ceiling and the league’s commitment not to appear to intervene in a 
game’s outcome. Some years later, the abuses of the Flyers largely gone, more subtle abuses increase. 
What the league never understood about the Flyers, what it doesn’t understand now, is that it cannot be 
the passive actor it wishes to be. That like any laissez-faire, non-interventionist approach, there are con-
sequences predictable and certain that follow for which it is responsible, and by deciding not to inter-
vene it is in fact intervening just as surely on behalf of those consequences, a league, through its refer-
ees, sends messages to the game, the players react, the game takes on its form. But what is the message, 
and what is the form? And what would it be like if the message was different?”); id. at 251 (“[I]t was in 
the late 1940s that a pattern of violence entered the game. For the first time, it became part of the regu-
lar play. And when it wasn’t removed, it only meant it would get worse. The nature of violence, the 
emerging style of play, guaranteed it.”); id. (explaining that violence escalated after the rules changed to 
allow forward passing, which, in turn, required defensemen to adapt their style of play: “It was from 
this simmering frustration that violence emerged. Brawling and stick-swinging became more frequent 
and vicious than before. **** The league intervened with fines and suspensions for the worst abuses, 
but it did nothing to penalize its insidious causes, in the end more damaging to the game.”); id. at 254 
(“For adrenaline has its dark side. Fouled or resisted, it turns to anger, frustration, retaliation. And in-
side, a pattern of violence allowed many years before, it sends violence spiraling [sic] higher.”); id. at 
260 (“And the league must deliver a message, clear and uncompromising: hooking, holding, and high-
sticking will be penalized, so that the quick and skilled are not, so that open ice created will not be tak-
en away.”).  
116 See e.g., W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 6, at 119–21; Mendelson, supra note 28, at 36 (“In tres-
pass, consent can be vitiated by duress, trickery, withholding of information in bad faith, or fraud...”) 
(footnote omitted).  
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A plaintiff cannot ordinarily be regarded as actually con-
senting to the defendant’s conduct if the plaintiff assent-
ed to the conduct while mistaken about the nature and 
quality of the invasion intended by the defendant. Like-
wise, an overt manifestation of assent or willingness 
would not be effective apparent consent if the defendant 
knew, or probably if he ought to have known in the ex-
ercise of reasonable care, that the plaintiff was mistaken 
as to the nature and quality of the invasion intended.117    
 
Professor Moore adds: “Under current doctrine, however, consent 
will be ineffective only in situations where the defendant knew of the 
defect and failed to inform the plaintiff – i.e., when the defendant 
fraudulently obtained the plaintiff's consent.”118 According to the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts, "If the person consenting to the conduct 
of another is induced to consent by a substantial mistake concerning 
the nature of the invasion of his interests or the extent of the harm to 
be expected from it and the mistake is known to the other or is in-
duced by the other's misrepresentation, the consent is not effective 
for the unexpected invasion or harm.”119 Consider the effects of this 
doctrine as it relates to the current NHL and NFL litigation regarding 
concussions and the long-term effects of CTE on players.120 One 
                                                 
117 W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 6, at 119 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 114 (“Consent…is in-
effective, if…the consenting person was mistaken about the nature and quality of the invasion intended 
by the conduct.”). 
118 Moore, supra note 10, at 1634 (emphasis in original) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
892B(2)). 
119 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892B(2). 
120 See e.g. In re Nat. Football League Players' Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351, 361 (E.D. Pa. 
2015) (“On July 19, 2011, 73 former professional football players filed suit in the Superior Court of 
California, Los Angeles County, against the NFL Parties. They alleged that the NFL Parties failed to 
take reasonable actions to protect players from the chronic risks created by concussive and sub-
concussive head injuries and fraudulently concealed those risks from players. In response, the Judicial 
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these cases before this Court as a multidistrict litigation 
(“MDL”). Since consolidation, about 5,000 players (“MDL Plaintiffs”) have filed over 300 substantially 
similar lawsuits against the NFL Parties… MDL Plaintiffs allege that head injuries lead to a host of 
debilitating conditions, including Alzheimer's disease, dementia, depression, deficits in cognitive func-
tioning, reduced processing speed, attention and reasoning, loss of memory, sleeplessness, mood 
swings, and personality changes. MDL Plaintiffs also allege that the repetitive head trauma sustained 
while playing football causes a gradual build-up of tau protein in the brain, resulting in Chronic Trau-
matic Encephalopathy (“CTE”). CTE allegedly causes an increased risk of suicide, and many symptoms 
often associated with Alzheimer's Disease and dementia, as well as with mood disorders such as depres-
sion and loss of emotional control.”); In re Nat. Hockey League Players' Concussion Injury Litig., MDL 
14-2551 SRN, 2015 WL 1334027, at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 25, 2015) (“Litigation was initiated by former 
National Hockey League players who allege that Defendant National Hockey League (the “NHL”) is 
responsible for ‘the pathological and debilitating effects of brain injuries caused by concussive and sub-
concussive impacts sustained ... during their professional careers… As defined in the Master Complaint, 
a “concussion” or “mild traumatic brain injury” (“MTBI”), “consists of trauma to the head and a result-
ing transient loss of normal brain function. According to Plaintiffs, repeated MTBI can trigger progres-
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might initially surmise that professional hockey and football players 
have consented – and continue to consent – to the intentional physi-
cal contacts that are inherent as part of those games. But, if the 
leagues (i.e., executives responsible for operating the leagues) did, in 
fact, know, as the plaintiffs in the litigation have alleged, the magni-
tude of those dangers, yet failed to disclose them to the players, then, 
as Prosser explained, there can be neither actual nor apparent consent 
using the traditional Tort terminology.  
The revised terminology proposed above does not change this con-
clusion. Logically, although the external indicia of the players’ con-
sent may have been present, “[w]here there has been active misrepre-
sentation, this has been held to invalidate the consent, so that there is 
battery….”121  Even in the face of “express consent” or “consent im-
plied in fact,” misrepresentation by the leagues ought to cancel either 
language (e.g., express) or conduct (e.g., implied in fact) that other-
wise would ordinarily evince consent, because the act of misrepre-
sentation effectively nullifies any reliance that the leagues might 
have placed on the ordinary meanings associated with the players’ 
language or conduct.122 Again, Prosser remarks: “The decisions in 
this area have involved assent induced by fraud, in the sense that the 
defendant was either aware of the plaintiff’s mistake or ignorance 
and failed to disclose the truth, or the defendant induced the mistake 
with representation which he knew was false.”123    
II. CONCLUSION 
Chances are that human beings will continue to engage in sports 
and recreational activities that pose significant risks of serious bodily 
harm. We have been doing so for millennia, and those participating 
in sports and recreational activities are likely to continue to assume 
the risks of negligence and consent to harmful and offensive physical 
contact willingly. As was mentioned, we willingly assume these risks 
and consent to these contacts for a variety of reasons. Money, re-
                                                                                                                
sive degeneration of brain tissue and can lead to Alzheimer's disease, dementia, and chronic traumatic 
encephalopathy (“CTE”) (a disease caused by the accumulation of a toxic protein in the brain). In fact, 
Plaintiffs claim, ‘scientific evidence has for decades linked head trauma to long-term neurological prob-
lems.”)id. at *2 (“Plaintiffs state that they relied on the NHL for information about health and safety, 
and that they were never informed of the negative long-term effects of sustaining concussions."); W. 
Page Keeton et al., supra note 6, at 120 (footnote omitted). 
 
122 See e.g., Wright, supra note 49, at 1414 (“[A] number of factors may prevent apparent consent from 
being genuine consent. Coercion, deficient or mistaken information, ideological distortion, impairment 
of capacity to consent, and weak relative bargaining position have all been thought capable of under-
mining the validity of consent.”) (footnotes omitted). 
123 W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 6, at 120. 
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spect, peer pressure, the thrill of participation or competition,124 the 
opportunity for achievement, pride, fame, glory, and a host of other 
incentives drive us to take the calculated risks and subject ourselves 
to certain intentional physical contacts that are part-and-parcel of 
such sports and recreational activities. 
This Article has explained that there are important common 
threads that bind the legal doctrines and analyses relating to assump-
tion of risk of negligence, consent to intentional Torts, and Contract 
formation. The first common thread is that, in each of those areas of 
law, we strive to use a reasonable person standard when imposing 
obligations and liability. Therefore, for example, when a reasonable 
person in the position of a defendant would interpret the plaintiff’s 
language and/or conduct as communicating a willingness to subject 
himself (i.e., the plaintiff) to the harmful physical contact of a body-
check in an ice hockey game, the defendant is not liable for injuries 
caused by such a body-check. The second common thread is that we 
also try to respect the subjective thoughts and desires of the plaintiff. 
So if a football player subjectively thinks to himself, “yes, I’m will-
ing to have opponents tackle me when I’m running in bounds, hold-
ing the football,” he consents to the physical contact of the tackling 
opponent. But as was mentioned,125 when the subjective thoughts of 
a plaintiff conflict with the reasonable perceptions of a defendant, the 
better policy is not to impose liability on the defendant who has acted 
reasonably, relying on the communicative message conveyed by the 
plaintiff’s language and/or conduct.126 Proving actual consent, or 
what we might call “subjective consent,” is nearly impossible. In 
1907, the Missouri Court of Appeals soberly explained the rationale 
for this rule: 
 
The law imputes to a person an intention corresponding 
to the reasonable meaning of his words and acts. It judg-
es his intention by his outward expressions and excludes 
all questions in regard to his unexpressed intention. If 
his words or acts, judged by a reasonable standard, man-
ifest an intention to agree in regard to the matter in ques-
tion, that agreement is established, and it is immaterial 
what may be the real, but unexpressed state of his mind 
                                                 
124 See e.g., Simons, supra note 5, at 259 (noting that occasionally “the risk was an essential part of the 
pleasure that plaintiff derived from his choice.”) (footnote omitted). 
125 See supra Part III, Section A. 
126 See e.g., Dan B. Dobbs et. al., supra note 13, § 96 , 218-19 (Manifestation of Consent, The Standard: 
Manifested or Objectively Determinable Consent) (“The question is whether the defendant reasonably 
believed that the plaintiff’s words or conduct reflected a genuine consent.”). 
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on the subject.127   
 
Therefore, as is the case with Contract law, Tort law ought to re-
ject the validity of actual/subjective consent in situations where a 
reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have mis-
perceived the plaintiff’s subjective intent.128 Instead, Tort law ought 
to adopt a wholly objective test for consent based on a reasonable 
person’s perception of the plaintiff’s outward manifestations that 
communicate consent – both verbal and non-verbal – coupled with 
circumstances that otherwise permit a defendant to rely on other fac-
tors, such as societal customs, that would lead a reasonable person to 
infer consent (e.g., medical emergencies). In other words, Tort law 
ought to recognize the validity of consent only when it is expressed 
in language, implied in fact by conduct, or implied in law for reasons 
of justice (e.g., such as in medical emergencies).129 
In essence, this Article contends that Tort law stands the best 
chance of achieving the goals of assumption of risk and consent 
when we use the objective, outward manifestations of a person’s in-
tent (i.e., the external indicia of intent) rather than relying on self-
serving testimony regarding a person’s inner – but hidden/secret – 
thoughts.130 Perhaps one potential exception is viable, but that is 
problematic. Prosser suggests that, “[a]ctual willingness, established 
by competent evidence, will prevent liability; and, if it can ever be 
proved, will no doubt do so even though the plaintiff has done noth-
ing to manifest it to the defendant.”131 The principal problem with 
                                                 
127 Embry v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. App. 1907) (quoting 9 Cyc. 
245). 
128 Cf. Simons, supra note 5, at 253 (“Defendant's reliance is critical to his apparent consent or apparent 
assumption of risk claim….[T]here is no good reason to protect a defendant's reasonable, but possibly 
mistaken, beliefs unless his beliefs affected his conduct.”) (footnote omitted).  I disagree with Simons’s 
claim. There is certainly good reason. If the legal system were to allow a lack of proof of a defendant’s 
reliance to vitiate “apparent consent,” then we open the door for self-serving testimony and unhelpful 
“swearing-matches” between plaintiffs and defendants, who will undoubtedly say contradictory things 
about their subjective understandings regarding the defendant’s subjective reliance. 
129 See Bell, supra note 63, at 24 (“The law of contracts and torts tends to regard consent objectively, as 
something established or negated by observable proofs, such as a party’s manifestations.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
130 See Simons, supra note 5, at 235–36 (“Common sense will be a guide in significant categories of 
cases, such as injuries to spectators and participants in sporting events, to customers of amusement 
parks, or to employees working with dangerous machinery.”) (footnote omitted). Although common 
sense is certainly helpful to supplement the application of clear legal definitions and analysis, the start-
ing point must be clear definitions and analysis. 
131 W. Page Keeton et al., supra note 6, at 113. In his footnote, Prosser writes: “What if plaintiff writes 
in his secret diary, later produced in evidence, that he would be glad to have the defendant come upon 
his land and use his tennis court? There are no cases.” See also Dan B. Dobbs et. al., supra note 13, § 
95, 217 (Consent as a Bar) (“The plaintiff likewise effectively consents if she actually or subjectively 
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exonerating a defendant, who had no reason to believe that the plain-
tiff has consented to an intentional tort, is that, in some cases, such a 
rule would excuse a person for conduct that would otherwise be tor-
tious (i.e., in the absence of subjective/actual consent) in circum-
stances where his conduct is unreasonable. A policy of sanctioning 
such conduct has the prospect of condoning intentionally tortious ac-
tions, encouraging protracted, unnecessary discovery (e.g., defendant 
going on the proverbial “fishing expedition,” hoping to find some 
scintilla of evidence – such as Prosser’s hypothetical secret diary), 
and also encouraging false testimony.132 
A rule that renders actual subjective, but unmanifested consent as 
valid seems illogical.  First, it is very unlikely that a defendant could 
prove it because private, unmanifested thoughts are generally only 
entertained inside the thoughts and mind of the plaintiff.  Perhaps, on 
occasion, a defendant could find a third party to testify that the plain-
tiff had manifested consent to the third party as proof of subjective 
consent. Or, as has been suggested, a letter, diary, or a note could 
serve as evidence.  But such proof seems far too susceptible to fabri-
cation or forgery.  It seems bad social policy to permit defendants to 
commit intentional torts in the absence of verbal or non-verbal con-
sent, or at the very least, circumstances where policy encourages 
such conduct (e.g., medical emergencies).  Allowing evidence of 
subjective but unmanifested consent would encourage fraudulent tes-
timony and the falsification through the fabrication of forged writ-
ings.  
 
 
                                                                                                                
consents to the defendant’s conduct, even if that consent is not expressed or manifested.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
132 Contract law takes the position that evidence of the subjective intent of parties is irrelevant and in-
admissible. See Embry v. Hargadine-McKittrick Dry Goods Co., 105 S.W. 777 (Mo. 1907) (“the inner 
intention of parties to a conversation subsequently alleged to create a contract cannot either make a con-
tract of what transpired, or prevent one from arising, if the words used were sufficient to constitute a 
contract. In so far as their intention is an influential element, it is only such intention as the words or 
acts of the parties indicate; not one secretly cherished which is inconsistent with those words or 
acts…”).  
